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As part of its comprehensive revision of the Criminal Code in
1978, the Alaska legislature adopted a sweeping revision of the state's
sentencing laws.' The most significant aspect of the sentencing revi-
sion was the enactment of a presumptive sentencing system. Presump-
tive sentencing substantially restricts judicial sentencing discretion by
specifying in advance the presumptive term of imprisonment that the
typical defendant convicted of an offense should receive.2 Legislative
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1. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 219 (effective Jan. 1,
1980) [hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Code].
2. The presumptive term of imprisonment is set by the legislature, or other body
designated by the legislature, and may be varied by the trial court within a designated
range if the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors is established at sentencing.
Other features of a presumptive sentencing scheme include: the specification of in-
creasingly severe presumptive terms of imprisonment based on the prior criminal his-
tory of the defendant; provisions allowing deviation from the presumptive term of
imprisonment in extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances; and significant re-
strictions on the authority of a parole board or other administrative agency to release
a prisoner before the expiration of his sentence. See generally TASK FORCE ON CRIMI-
NAL SENTENCING, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT
19-22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
Thirteen states in addition to Alaska have now adopted some form of presump-
tive sentencing system. ARIz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-601 to -604, 13-701 to -709
(1978 & Supp. 1984-1985); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-1170.95, 12022-12022.7 (West
1982 & Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.001 (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3 to -3.2, 1005-8-1 to
-7 (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-lA-1 to -2-9
(Bums 1979 & Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:43-1 to :44-5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-
18-15 to -20 (1981 & Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.1-.7 (1983); 42 PA.
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commentary3 makes it clear that the purpose of the presumptive sen-
tencing system is "the elimination of unjustified disparity in sentences
imposed on defendants convicted of similar offenses - disparity which
is not related to legally relevant sentencing criteria."'4
Studies of felony sentencing practices published by the Alaska Ju-
dicial Council5 dramatically brought the problem of unjustified dispar-
ity in sentencing to the attention of the state legislature. The studies'
most disturbing finding was that for some crimes, all other factors be-
ing equal, the defendant's race was a significant factor affecting both
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-27-10 to -70 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.010-.910 (Supp. 1985).
The Criminal Code Revision Subcommission which proposed the Criminal Code
to the legislature, see infra note 62, relied on a report by the Task Force on Criminal
Sentencing, established by the Twentieth Century Fund, see TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra in drafting its version of a presumptive sentencing system. See ALASKA CRIMI-
NAL CODE REVISION SUBCOMMISSION, ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REV. pt. 6, at 9
(Tent. Draft 1978) (citing the reader to the task force report for a "full discussion of
presumptive sentencing.") [hereinafter cited as ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REVISION];
see also Heathcock v. State, 670 P.2d 1155, 1159 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (Single-
ton, J., concurring and dissenting).
The task force recommended presumptive sentencing as an alternative to what it
referred to as the then existing "dominant sentencing structure currently employed in
the United States. . .based on the indeterminate sentence." TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra at 11. Additionally, the task force viewed presumptive sentencing as a prefera-
ble alternative to proposals for flat-time or mandatory minimum sentencing. Id. at 15-
18.
3. The Alaska Senate published the commentary to the Criminal Code as a sup-
plement to its daily journal. ALASKA SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE, ALASKA SENATE J. SuPP. No. 47
(June 12, 1978) [hereinafter cited as ALASKA SENATE COMMENTARY]. The Alaska
House of Representatives subsequently adopted this commentary. ALASKA HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMENTARY ON THE ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL
CODE, ALASKA HOUSE J. at 1716 (June 16, 1978). The Alaska Court of Appeals has
frequently referred to the commentary in determining the legislature's intent in enact-
ing particular sections of the Criminal Code. See, e.g., State v. Rastopsoff, 659 P.2d
630, 635-36 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Wasson v. State, 652 P.2d 117, 119 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1982).
4. ALASKA SENATE COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 148 (citations omitted). See
also Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823, 829-30 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), modified, 655 P.2d
30 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
5. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING PATTERNS: A
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (1974-1976) (Prelim. Report 1977) [herein-
after cited as ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING]; ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SEN-
TENCING IN ALASKA: A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS AND SUMMARY OF
STATISTICAL DATA FOR 1973 (1975) (B. Cutler, Research Attorney) [hereinafter cited
as SENTENCING IN ALASKA]. These studies are cited in the legislative commentary to
the Criminal Code immediately following the legislature's declaration that the pur-
pose of the sentencing revisions is to eliminate unjustified disparity in sentencing.
ALASKA SENATE COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 148.
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the type of sentence imposed and its length.6 The studies also showed
that the sentencing judge's character as a "strict" or "lenient" sen-
tencer was another critical factor influencing sentence length for some
crimes. 7 Surprisingly, the studies showed that factors usually expected
to play a significant role in determining sentence length were of little
importance. 8
6. The summary section of the council's 1975 study noted that:
A higher percentage of some groups of persons were convicted or sen-
tenced more harshly than other groups, however. Even when many other
factors were held equal, some groups of persons still appeared to receive
disparate treatment. For example, two-thirds of all Blacks sentenced for
robbery received sentences of five years or greater, while less the one-third of
Caucasions did, even though twice as many Caucasians sentenced for rob-
bery had prior felony records as Blacks.
SENTENCING IN ALASKA, supra note 5, at 175.
The council found that the incidence of probation sentences varied more by race
than by any other factor. Id. at 139. "Statewide, only 23% of Blacks and only 25%
of Alaska Natives received probation, while 43% of Caucasians received probation."
Id. The council cautioned that the apparent disparities highlighted in its 1975 study
could be "the correct result of differences in individual sentencing needs." Id. at 175-
76. Nevertheless, it concluded that "disparities of such great proportion as noted [in
the study], especially among racial groups, suggests strongly an anomalous influence
in the sentencing process that warrants careful follow-up investigation." Id. at 176.
The "follow-up investigation" called for was conducted in the subsequent council
study of statewide felony sentences in Alaska between August, 1974 and August,
1976. ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 5. This report confirmed at least
some of the fears first raised in the 1975 study.
One of the most disturbing findings of the study concerned the impact on
sentence length of membership in the black race. After taking into account
the independent contribution of all other factors in the study, being black in
and of itself contributed an estimated 11.9 months to drug felony sentences
and 6.5 months to sentences for crimes of theft or unlawful entry. This in-
dependent "blackness factor" survived both statistical tests and was shown
to increase the severity of sentences entirely aside from such considerations
as employment history, educational level, occupation, income, prior criminal
history and probation or parole status. Blackness was not a factor, however,
in crimes of violence or in frauds, forgeries or embezzlements.
Id. at v-vi.
The council noted that the average additional 11.9 months imposed upon blacks
convicted of drug felonies "is more than the estimated contribution of a record of
three or more prior misdemeanors, or that of being convicted of sale of narcotics (the
most serious drug felony studied)." Id. at 43. The council further found that for
those defendants convicted of burglary, larceny, and receiving and concealing stolen
property, blacks received sentences averaging about 6.4 months longer than whites.
Id. at 28. "This estimate takes all other factors recorded in the study into account. In
other words, entirely apart from criminal record, type of offense charged, income, etc.,
being black was associated with a significantly higher sentence." Id. The council sug-
gested that this "disturbing" finding may be interpreted either as a reflection of minor-
ity group disadvantages, or as evidence "that the criminal justice system in Alaska
discriminates against blacks." Id. at 28-29.
7. ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 20-22, 40-46.
8. The council found "that in the violent crime category, neither extent of physi-
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Presumptive sentencing has now been in effect in Alaska for five
years.9 During that period, the legislature has made several significant
amendments to the statutory scheme and Alaska's appellate courts
have decided numerous cases interpreting the scope of individual sec-
tions. This article examines Alaska's presumptive sentencing system
in light of the legislative and judicial developments since enactment.
The article is divided into three sections. The first section provides an
overview of the presumptive sentencing system. The second section
examines in greater detail two of its key components: the use of prior
convictions to establish repeat felony offender status, and the aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors used by courts to adjust the presumptive
term. The third section discusses how presumptive sentencing has af-
fected appellate review of sentences imposed on first felony offenders'0
not covered by presumptive sentencing.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING
A defendant is subject to presumptive sentencing if he is con-
victed of a crime classified as a class A felony," sexual assault in the
cal injury to the victim (short of death) nor the use of a firearm by the defendant had
any significant independent impact on sentence length." ALASKA FELONY SENTENC-
ING, supra note 5, at ii. Only where the victim died did injury to the victim affect the
length of the offender's sentence. Id. at 24.
9. Although the legislature passed the Criminal Code in 1978, the Code did not
take effect until January 1, 1980. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess.
Laws 219. This article will examine legislative and judicial developments pertaining
to presumptive sentencing occurring before April 12, 1985.
10. The term first felony offender will hereinafter be used to refer to a defendant
who has no prior felony convictions that a court can consider for purposes of pre-
sumptive sentencing. The term second felony offender will hereinafter be used to refer
to a defendant who has one prior felony conviction that can be considered for pur-
poses of presumptive sentencing. See infra note 24 (defining the terms third felony
offender and repeat felony offender for the purposes of this article).
11. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c) (1984). The Criminal Code classifies the over-
whelming majority of offenses into six categories according to the seriousness of the
conduct defined - class A, B, and C felonies; class A and B misdemeanors; and viola-
tions. Id. § 11.81.250(a)(1)-(6) (1983). A limited number of the most serious offenses
defined in the Criminal Code are not classified under this structure, see id.
§ 11.81.250(a), and are referred to as unclassified felonies.
Class A felonies are the most serious classified offenses in the Criminal Code and
"involve conduct resulting in serious physical injury or a substantial risk of serious
physical injury to a person." Id. § 11.81.250(a)(1). See, e.g., id. § 11.41.120 (1983)
(manslaughter); id. § 11.41.500 (1983) (robbery in the first degree).
When it enacted the Criminal Code, the legislature did not reclassify offenses
defined outside the Criminal Code under the classification scheme specified in
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.250 (1983). In subsequent years, however, the legislature used
the Criminal Code's classification scheme in authorizing penalties for crimes defined
outside the Criminal Code. See, e.g., id. §§ 04.16.180-.200 (1980 & Supp. 1984) (clas-
sifying crimes pertaining to the violation of Title 4 of the Alaska Statutes (concerning
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first degree, 12 or sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree. 13 Pre-
sumptive sentencing also applies to defendants convicted of class B
felonies 14 or class C felonies,' 5 but as a general rule, only if the defend-
ant has previously been convicted of another felony.' 6 The presump-
tive sentencing statutes, however, do not apply to sentencing for three
categories of crimes: (1) misdemeanors; 17 (2) felonies defined outside
the Criminal Code that carry their own specified penalties and are not
classified as class A, B, or C felonies;' 8 and (3) the unclassified felonies
in the Criminal Code of murder in the first degree, murder in the sec-
ond degree, kidnapping, and misconduct involving a controlled sub-
stance in the first degree.' 9
A defendant subject to presumptive sentencing faces a term of
imprisonment that varies according to the crime he committed and his
alcoholic beverages) under the classification scheme of the Criminal Code). Once a
felony is classified as a class A, B, or C felony, the terms of imprisonment specified in
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (1984), including any prescribed presumptive term of im-
prisonment, apply to persons convicted of that felony.
12. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i) (1984). The crime of sexual assault in the first
degree is defined in id. § 11.41.410 (1983).
13. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i) (1984). The crime of sexual abuse of a minor in
the first degree is defined in id. § 11.41.434 (1983).
14. Class B felonies "involve conduct resulting in less severe violence against a
person than class A felonies, aggravated offenses against property interests, or aggra-
vated offenses against public administration or order." ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.81.250(a)(2). See, e.g., id. § 11.46.300 (1983) (burglary in the first degree); id.
§ 11.56.200 (1983) (perjury).
15. Class C felonies "involved conduct serious enough to deserve felony classifica-
tion but not serious enough to be classified as A or B felonies." ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.81.250(a)(3). See, e.g.,id. § 11.41.530 (coercion); id. § 11.46.520 (criminal pos-
session of a forgery device).
16. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)-(e) (1984). A very limited category of class
B and C felonies is also subject to presumptive sentencing, regardless of whether the
defendant has previously been convicted of a felony. See infra note 155 (discussion of
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(3), (e)(3) (1983). The type of prior felony conviction
that can satisfy the previous felony conviction requirement is discussed infra text ac-
companying notes 63-105.
17. The Criminal Code specifies two classes of misdemeanors, class A and class B.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.250(a)(4)-(5) (1983). Class A misdemeanors are punishable by
a maximum term of imprisonment of one year while class B misdemeanors are punish-
able by a maximum term of imprisonment of 90 days unless otherwise specified in the
provision defining the offense. Id. § 12.55.135(a)-(b) (1984).
18. Since presumptive terms of imprisonment are specified only for class A, B,
and C felonies, and for the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual abuse
of a minor in the first degree, unclassified crimes outside the Criminal Code are not
subject to presumptive sentencing. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)-(e), (i) (1984).
If, however, a felony defined outside the Criminal Code does not include a penalty
provision, it is automatically classified as a class C felony, id. § 11.81.250(b) (1983),
and consequently, is subject to the presumptive terms of imprisonment specified in id.
§ 12.55.125(e).
19. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a)-(b) (1984).
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prior criminal history.20 The sentence length equals an amount "the
average defendant convicted of an offense should be sentenced to, ab-
sent the presence of legislatively prescribed factors in aggravation or
mitigation or extraordinary circumstances. '21 For example, a defend-
ant sentenced for a class C felony who has one prior felony convic-
tion 22 faces a presumptive term of imprisonment of two years.23 A
defendant sentenced for the same felony but with two or more prior
felony convictions24 faces a presumptive term of imprisonment of
three years. 25
The trial court may increase or decrease a presumptive term of
imprisonment depending on the presence of certain aggravating or
mitigating factors.26 The legislature has identified twenty-six aggra-
vating and fifteen mitigating factors. 27 The trial court may consider
only these forty-one factors in adjusting a presumptive term of impris-
onment. 28 The parties must establish the presence of any aggravating
20. See id. § 12.55.125(c)-(e), (i). A defendant who is subject to presumptive
sentencing but is sentenced without regard to the requirements of presumptive sen-
tencing is sentenced illegally. On appeal, the sentence will be vacated. Kelly v. State,
663 P.2d 967, 974-75 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
21. ALASKA SENATE COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 153.
22. The type of prior felony conviction that can be considered for purposes of
presumptive sentencing is discussed infra text accompanying notes 63-105.
23. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(e)(1) (1984).
24. The term third felony offender will hereinafter be used to refer to a defendant
who has two or more prior felony convictions that can be considered for purposes of
presumptive sentencing. The terms first felony offender and second felony offender,
see supra note 10, as well as the term third felony offender are frequently used by the
Alaska Court of Appeals to describe the status of a defendant subject to presumptive
sentencing. See, eg., Shaw v. State, 673 P.2d 781, 785 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Fry v.
State, 655 P.2d 789, 791 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
The term repeat felony offender will hereinafter be used to refer to a defendant
who is a second or third felony offender, if, in the context in which the term is used, it
is not necessary to distinguish between a second and third felony offender.
25. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(e)(2) (1984).
26. Id. § 12.55.155(a) (1984). If the trial court imposes a sentence different from
the presumptive term of imprisonment without having found aggravating or mitigat-
ing factors, it has imposed an illegal sentence that will be vacated on appeal. See State
v. LaPorte, 672 P.2d 466, 467-68 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); see also McManners v.
State, 650 P.2d 414, 416 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (irrelevant that sentence in excess of
the presumptive term is suspended).
The inability of a trial court to reduce a presumptive term of imprisonment unless
mitigating factors are established does not violate the separation of powers doctrine or
the constitutional requirement that "[p]enal administration shall be based on the prin-
ciple of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public." Koteles v. State,
660 P.2d 1199, 1200 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (citing ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12).
27. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)-(d) (1984).
28. Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823, 831-32 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (citing ALASKA
SENATE COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 160), modified, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983). If the trial court adjusts the presumptive term of imprisonment for aggravating
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and mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.29 The court may rely on evidence presented at trial as
well as additional information presented at the sentencing hearing in
determining whether any aggravating and mitigating factors are
present.30
Voluntary drug or alcohol intoxication or addiction is specifically
excluded from consideration as an aggravatg or mitigating factor.31
Additionally, an aggravating factor may not be used to increase the
presumptive term if the same factor was used previously to trigger
presumptive sentencing or to require a higher presumptive term of im-
prisonment for the crime, or if the factor is a necessary element of the
offense in question.32 Similarly, a mitigating factor may not be used to
or mitigating factors that have not been specified by the legislature, the sentence im-
posed will be vacated on appeal. See Woods v. State, 667 P.2d 184, 186-87 (Alaska
1983).
29. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(f) (1984).
30. Wolf v. State, 647 P.2d 609, 610-11 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
31. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(g) (1984). The exclusion of voluntary intoxica-
tion from consideration as a mitigating factor does not violate equal protection.
Wright v. State, 656 P.2d 1226, 1227-28 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); see also State v.
Ahwinona, 635 P.2d 488, 491 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).
Since only the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(c)-(d) (1984) may be considered by the trial court in adjusting the pre-
sumptive term of imprisonment, see supra note 28 and accompanying text, it might be
argued that it was unnecessary to specifically exclude voluntary intoxication or addic-
tion from consideration as an aggravating or mitigating factor. Nevertheless, the spe-
cific exclusion of intoxication or addiction as a sentencing consideration probably
reflects the legislature's intent to prevent courts from using those factors as a basis for
a finding of manifest injustice authorizing referral of a case to a three-judge sentencing
panel under ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.165-.175 (1984). See infra text accompanying
notes 43-59.
32. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(e) (1984). See Woods v. State, 667 P.2d 184, 187-
88 (Alaska 1983) (causing physical injury can be used to increase presumptive term
for sexual assault in the first degree because physical injury is not a necessary element
of sexual assault); Roberts v. State, 680 P.2d 503, 508 n.13 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984)
(aggravating factor of causing physical injury can be used to increase presumptive
term for robbery in the second degree because physical injury is not a necessary ele-
ment of robbery).
The prohibition specified in section 12.55.155(e) does not "preclude the use of a
prior conviction to invoke presumptive sentencing when that prior conviction is a
necessary element of the present offense." Fry, 655 P.2d at 791.
In Juneby, the court of appeals cited ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(e) in support of
its holding that conduct for which a defendant has been separately convicted and
sentenced may not be considered to establish an aggravating factor to increase the
presumptive term imposed for another crime. 641 P.2d at 842-43. The trial court had
ruled that Juneby's unlawful entry into the victim's home "was among the most seri-
ous conduct included in the definition" of sexual assault. Id. at 842. Juneby had also
been convicted and sentenced for burglary for that same unlawful entry. Id. The
court of appeals ruled that it was improper to use the illegal entry to increase Juneby's
presumptive term for sexual assault, id. at 842-43, stating that the legislative policy of
19851
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decrease the presumptive term if previously used at trial to reduce the
charge to a lesser included offense.33
If the prosecution establishes an aggravating factor, the trial
court may increase the presumptive term of imprisonment, provided
that the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum
sentence for the crime.34 If the defendant establishes a mitigating fac-
tor, the trial court may reduce the presumptive term of imprisonment
by a maximum amount that depends upon the length of the presump-
tive term of imprisonment. 35 A presumptive term of imprisonment of
four years or less can be reduced by any amount.36 A court may re-
duce a presumptive term of greater than four years to no less than one-
half the presumptive term.37
In the vast majority of cases subject to presumptive sentencing,
the trial court cannot suspend imposition of a sentence. 38 Further-
more, the power of the trial court to suspend even a portion of the
sentence or to place the defendant on probation is substantially re-
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(e) sought to "avoid double punishment for the same con-
duct." Id. at 842. Thus, "[tihe judge's finding that Juneby's sexual assault was the
most serious within the definition of the offense ... amounted to punishing Juneby
twice for the same conduct: first, by imposing the sentence for burglary; second, by
aggravating his presumptive term for sexual assault." Id.
33. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(e).
34. Id. § 12.55.155(a) (1984). Guidelines that a trial court must use when varying
a presumptive term to account for aggravating factors are discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 121-45.
35. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(a).
36. Id. § 12.55.155(a)(1). Guidelines that a trial court must use when varying a
presumptive term to account for mitigating factors are discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 129-41.
37. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(a)(2).
38. Id. § 12.55.155(g)(2) (1984). The restrictions on the trial court's ability to
vary the presumptive sentence discussed infra text accompanying notes 39-42, do not
apply in the very limited number of cases where a first felony offender convicted of a
class B or C felony is subject to presumptive sentencing. See infra note 155. When
the legislature created this category of first felony offenders subject to presumptive
sentencing in 1983, it neglected to make a conforming amendment to the statute
which restricts a trial court's ability to suspend imposition of sentence, place a defend-
ant on probation, or otherwise reduce a term of imprisonment when the defendant is
subject to presumptive sentencing. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(g). See Act of July 3,
1983, ch. 92, § 1-3, 1983 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 1-2. This group of first felony offenders
is apparently subject to presumptive sentencing but the trial court's ability to suspend
imposition of sentence or place the defendant on probation for any or all of the sen-
tence remains unrestricted. See infra note 60 (discussing the parole eligibility of these
offenders). Furthermore, these restrictions only apply to the trial court's ability to
suspend imposition of sentence or impose probation. If the trial court finds that mani-
fest injustice would result from its inability to exercise one of these sentencing options,
and the three-judge panel agrees with that finding, the panel may suspend imposition
of sentence or impose probation. See infra text accompanying notes 43-59; see also
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.015(a)(2), (a)(7), (a)(8) (1984).
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stricted.39 The extent of this restriction depends on whether the trial
court used aggravating or mitigating factors to impose a sentence
other than the presumptive term of imprisonment. If neither party
established aggravating or mitigating factors, the presumptive term
must be imposed and no portion of it may be suspended.4° If only
aggravating factors are established and the court imposes a term of
imprisonment in excess of the presumptive term, the court may sus-
pend a portion of that sentence, but the unsuspended portion must be
at least equal to the presumptive term of imprisonment. 4' If mitigat-
ing factors are established, the court may suspend all or a portion of
the term, provided that the remaining term is not less than the mini-
mum sentence allowed by establishment of mitigating factors.42
The following chart shows the presumptive terms of imprison-
ment in years (circled) authorized for defendants subject to presump-
tive sentencing classified according to the offense for which sentence is
to be imposed and whether the defendant is a first, second, or third
felony offender. The figure to the right of the presumptive term speci-
fies the maximum term of imprisonment that a court can impose if
factors in aggravation are established, and the figure to the left of the
presumptive term specifies the minimum term of imprisonment a court
can impose if factors in mitigation are. established.
39. See ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.125(g)(1); see also Lacquement v. State, 644 P.2d
856, 862-64 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
40. Lacquement, 644 P.2d at 863.
41. Id. at 863, n.17.
42. Id. at 863. For example, a second felony offender convicted of a class B felony
could possibly have the entire four-year presumptive term of imprisonment specified
in ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(1) (1984) suspended if mitigating factors are estab-
lished, since the trial court may reduce a presumptive term of four years or less by an
amount as great as the presumptive term for factors in mitigation. See supra note 36
and accompanying text. By contrast, if a third felony offender is convicted of a class B
felony and factors in mitigation are established, the court may suspend a portion of
the sentence that is imposed, provided that the offender would still be required to
serve at least three years of imprisonment. The presumptive term of imprisonment for
a third felony offender convicted of a class B felony is six years, ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.125(d)(2), and under section 12.55.155(a)(2) the court may not reduce that
sentence below three years for factors in mitigation. See supra note 37 and accompa-
nying text. A trial court's decision to suspend any portion of the sentence because of
factors in mitigation is nevertheless subject to compliance with the Juneby guidelines
discussed infra text accompanying notes 131-45.
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Current
Offense
Sexual Assault
or Sexual
Abuse of a
Minor in the
First Degree
Class A Felony
Class B Felony
Class C Felony
First Felony Second Felony Third Felony
Offender Offender Offender
4 30
5 * 3 71/2 30 121/2 ()30
21/2 20
**/5 20)20 71/2 2031/2 20
0 100 10 3 10
0- 10
1/2 50 5 11/2 ( 5
0-5
Explanatory Notes
* Ten year presumptive term only applies if the defendant possessed a firearm,
used a dangerous instrument, or caused serious physical injury during the offense.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i)(2) (1984). All other cases are subject to the eight
year presumptive term.
** Seven year presumptive term only applies if the crime is other than
manslaughter and the defendant possessed a firearm, used a dangerous instrument,
caused serious physical injury or knowingly directed the conduct constituting the
offense at a uniformed or otherwise identified peace or correctional officer, firefighter,
ambulance attendant, or other emergency responder engaged in official duties.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(2) (1984). All other cases are subject to the five year
presumptive term.
*** Presumptive term of imprisonment only applies if the defendant knowingly
directed the conduct constituting the offense at a uniformed or otherwise identified
peace or correctional officer, fire fighter, ambulance attendant, or other emergency
responder engaged in official duties. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(3), (e)(3)
(1984). All other cases are not subject to presumptive sentencing and the defendant
faces a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years for a class B felony and five
years for a class C felony. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)-(e) (1984).
The presumptive sentencing system limits judicial sentencing dis-
cretion and minimizes the possibility that a sentence will reflect con-
siderations other than the nature of the offense and the prior criminal
history of the defendant. Since presumptive sentencing so significantly
restricts a trial court's sentencing discretion, however, the possibility
exists that the required sentence would be clearly inappropriate in a
particular case. "Wisely, [the legislature] included a safety valve to
deal with situations where the statute rigidly applied would work an
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injustice. '43 That "safety valve" is a panel of three superior court
judges which may sentence the defendant without regard to the pre-
sumptive sentencing system.44
In order for a defendant to be sentenced by the three judge panel,
the trial court must first find by clear and convincing evidence that
manifest injustice45 would result from imposing the sentence required
by the presumptive sentencing statutes.46 Injustice could result from
the trial court's inability to consider a relevant circumstance at sen-
tencing because it had not been included in the list of aggravating or
mitigating factors.47 Manifest injustice could also result if the pre-
sumptive term of imprisonment, even after it is adjusted for all rele-
vant aggravating and mitigating factors, is clearly inappropriate
considering the nature of the offense and the offender.48
The legislature anticipated that only rarely would compliance
with the presumptive sentencing statutes produce manifest injustice.49
While the court of appeals has concluded that it would be inconsistent
with the purpose of presumptive sentencing for trial courts to rou-
tinely send cases to the three-judge panel,50 it also has stated that
"where the issue of manifest injustice appears to be a close one, we
would urge sentencing judges to resolve any doubt in favor of a refer-
ral" to the panel.5 ' If a party disagrees with the trial court's finding on
manifest injustice, it may appeal that determination to the court of
appeals, but that court will reverse only "clearly mistaken"
decisions.52
The three-judge panel may review the sentencing issue de novo
and consider evidence that was not before the trial court. 53 If the
43. Heathcock v. State, 670 P.2d 1155, 1166 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (Singleton,
J., concurring and dissenting).
44. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.165-.175 (1984).
45. The term manifest injustice was not defined by the legislature. See id. It may,
however, be equated with the concept of "shocking to the conscience" or "obvious
unfairness." Lloyd v. State, 672 P.2d 152, 154 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
46. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.165; see also Heathcock 670 P.2d at 1156-57.
47. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.165. A trial court may not base a finding of manifest
injustice on the nature of the prior convictions which made the defendant a repeat
felony offender. See Walsh v. State, 677 P.2d 912, 919 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
48. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.165 (1984); see also Heathcock, 670 P.2d at 1157; La-
Porte, 672 P.2d at 468 & n.4.
49. ALASKA SENATE COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 162. The legislature, when
it enacted section 12.55.165 (1984) "recognize[d] that in rare situations, imposition of
a presumptive term of imprisonment, whether or not adjusted for aggravating or miti-
gating factors, [might] result in manifest injustice .... The legislature expect[ed],
however, that the probability of such a result [would] be minimal." Ia
50. Walsh, 677 P.2d at 919.
51. Lloyd, 672 P.2d at 155.
52. Walsh, 677 P.2d at 918.
53. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.175(b) (1984); see also Shaw, 673 P.2d at 784.
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panel disagrees with the trial court's finding of manifest injustice, it
must remand the case to the trial court for imposition of the sentence
required by the presumptive sentencing system.54 If, however, the
panel agrees with the trial court's finding of manifest injustice, the
panel may sentence the defendant to any term authorized for the crime
by statute.5 5 Consequently, if the trial court found that the require-
ments of presumptive sentencing would cause manifest injustice by
mandating the imposition of too lenient a sentence, the panel, if it
agrees with that finding, may sentence the defendant to any term of
imprisonment up to the maximum sentence for the crime.5 6 On the
other hand, if the trial court found that the requirements of presump-
tive sentencing would cause manifest injustice by requiring the imposi-
tion of too severe a sentence, the panel, if it agrees with that finding,
may impose a less severe sentence.5 7 The sentence imposed by the
panel may be less than that required by the presumptive sentencing
system, or it may be any other available sentencing option including
probation or a suspended imposition of sentence.58 The panel's find-
ings may be appealed to the court of appeals, which again may reverse
only "clearly mistaken" decisions.5 9
Most defendants sentenced under presumptive sentencing are not
eligible for parole6 ° The length of a term of imprisonment imposed
under presumptive sentencing can only be reduced for good behavior
while in prison. For every three days of good conduct served, the de-
fendant will receive a one day reduction in the sentence required to be
54. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.175(b); see also Shaw, 673 P.2d at 786.
55. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.175(b)-(c) (1984). The panel may not sentence the
defendant if it merely finds that manifest injustice would result from imposition of the
sentence required under the presumptive sentencing statutes. It must also agree with
the trial court's finding on why manifest injustice would result. For example, if the
trial court finds that manifest injustice would result because the required sentence is
too high, a finding by the panel that manifest injustice would result because the sen-
tence is too low would not constitute an agreement with the trial court's finding of
manifest injustice. Under such circumstances, the panel must remand the case to the
trial court for sentencing consistent with the presumptive sentencing scheme. See
Heathcock, 670 P.2d at 1158; see also Winfree v. State, 683 P.2d 284, 286 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1984).
56. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.175(c); see also ALASKA SENATE COMMENTARY,
supra note 3, at 162.
57. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.015, 175(c) (1984).
58. Id.
59. Shaw, 673 P.2d at 784.
60. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.15.180 (1982). This restriction does not apply in the
very limited number of cases where a first felony offender convicted of a class B or C
felony is subject to presumptive sentencing. See infra note 155 and accompanying
text. When the legislature created this category of first felony offenders subject to
presumptive sentencing, it neglected to make a conforming amendment to the parole
eligibility statute, ALASKA STAT. § 33.15.180 (1982), to preclude parole for this cate-
gory of offenders. See Act of July 3, 1983, ch. 92, 1983 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 1-2.
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served.61
II. Two KEY FEATURES OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING
Two components of the presumptive sentencing system proposed
by the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission 62 were the subject of
substantial scrutiny when the legislature adopted the Criminal Code.
Not surprisingly, these areas have also been subject to considerable
legislative amendment and judicial review since enactment.
A. Prior Felony Convictions Used to Establish Status as a Repeat
Felony Offender
Proof that the defendant has previously been convicted of a fel-
ony is critically important under the presumptive sentencing system.
The length of the presumptive sentence varies directly with the
number of the defendant's previous felony convictions. 63 Addition-
ally, most class B and C felony convictions are not even subject to
presumptive sentencing unless the defendant is a repeat felony
offenderA4
The Alaska legislature specified the type of prior convictions that
can be used to establish the defendant's status as a repeat felony of-
fender.65 The legislature also specified the procedures for establishing
prior convictions at sentencing. 66 The Alaska Court of Appeals subse-
61. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.010 (1982).
62. In 1976, the legislature established the Criminal Code Revision Subcommis-
sion and charged it with the responsibility of recommending "a comprehensive revi-
sion of the state's criminal laws including, but not limited to, necessary and topical
revisions of crimes, criminal procedure, sentencing, and parole and probation of of-
fenders, for submission to the legislature" by December 1, 1977. Act of June 3, 1976,
ch. 114, §§ 2-4, 1976 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 2-4. The Subcommission's proposed stat-
utes and accompanying commentary appear in a six-part Tentative Draft of the Crimi-
nal Code published between February, 1977 and February, 1978. ALASKA CRIMINAL
CODE REVISION SUBCOMMISSION, ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REv., pt. 1-6 (Tent.
Draft 1977-1978). Legislation encompassing the recommendations of the subcommis-
sion was introduced in the Alaska House of Representatives on January 19, 1978.
H.R. 661, 10th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1978).
63. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)-(e), (i) (1984).
64. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
65. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 108-09 (amended 1982).
The restrictions on using prior convictions to establish that the defendant is a repeat
felony offender do not otherwise limit the ability of a trial court to consider prior
convictions in imposing sentence. See Lee v. State, 673 P.2d 892, 895 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1983) and cases cited therein; see also Bloomstrand v. State, 656 P.2d 584, 591
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
66. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 109-10 (amended 1982).
The legislature made several amendments to the prior conviction statute in 1982. See
infra note 67. The statute now provides that "prior convictions not expressly admit-
ted by the defendant must be proved by authenticated copies of court records served"
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quently interpreted these specifications and the Alaska legislature
amended some of them in 1982.67
1. Type of Prior Conviction a Court May Consider. As originally
proposed by the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission, a prior con-
viction could not be used to establish the defendant's status as a repeat
felony offender unless it was of the same or more serious class of crime
than the crime for which sentence was to be imposed.68 For example,
a defendant to be sentenced for a class B felony would be considered a
second felony offender only if previously convicted of a class B or class
A felony. The subcommission's proposal, however, was rejected by
the legislature, which decided that the classification of the prior con-
viction under the Criminal Code was irrelevant. 69 Instead, the legisla-
ture merely required that the prior conviction, whether it occurred in
Alaska or in another jurisdiction, be for an offense "having elements
similar to those of a felony defined as such under Alaska law."'70
One of the first issues to arise in applying the legislature's stan-
dard for identifying prior convictions was whether the elements of the
at least 20 days before sentencing. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(b) (1984). See Huitt v.
State, 678 P.2d 415, 422 (Alaska Ct. App.1984) (failure of defendant to object at sen-
tencing hearing to lack of notice of prosecution's reliance on defendant's prior convic-
tion, absent any indication that defendant lacked opportunity to contest issue, or
suggestion that prior conviction is not a felony conviction, does not invalidate sen-
tence imposed); see also Maldonado v. State, 676 P.2d 1093, 1094-95 (Alaska Ct. App.
1984); Kelly v. State, 663 P.2d 967, 974 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
A defendant may contest the authenticity of a prior judgment or other matters
pertaining to why the prior conviction should not be considered for repeat felony sta-
tus. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(c) (1984). The defendant's objections are heard by
the court sitting without a jury. Id. § 12.55.145(d). The court of appeals has held that
the denial of a jury determination on whether a prior conviction can be used to estab-
lish that the defendant is a repeat felony offender does not violate the constitutional
right to trial by jury. Huitt, 678 P.2d at 422-23.
67. Act of July 3, 1982, ch. 143, §§ 32-35, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 26-27 (effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1982).
68. See ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REVISION, supra note 2, at 8, 71-72.
69. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(2).
70. Id. The statutory definition of a prior conviction does not require that the
prior conviction be for a felony. Id. Indeed, one judge on the court of appeals has
concluded that the definition should be read "literally so that conviction of any of-
fense, whether classified as a misdemeanor or a felony in another jurisdiction, which
had elements substantially identical to those of a felony defined as such under Alaska
law, would qualify as a prior felony conviction." Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 352 n.5
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984). While the court of appeals left this issue unresolved in Wells,
id. at 352, and despite the absence of the requirement within the statute, the legislature
clearly intended to require that the prior conviction be a felony conviction. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(1) (1984) (specifying a four year presumptive term "if
the offense is a second felony conviction" (emphasis added)); id. § 12.55.185(7) (1984)
(defining second felony conviction to mean "that the defendant previously has been
convicted of a felony" (emphasis added)).
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prior offense were to be compared to the elements of a felony in ex-
isting law or in the law that existed when the prior offense was com-
mitted. In Wasson v. State,7 1 the defendant argued that his prior
Alaska felony conviction for the theft of $387 under the repealed
grand larceny statute could not be used to establish that he was a third
felony offender.72 The repealed statute set a dividing line between fel-
ony and misdemeanor larceny at $250.7 3 The present Criminal Code,
effective at the time Wasson was sentenced, sets the dividing line at
$500. 74 Since the theft of $387 is only a misdemeanor under current
law,75 Wasson argued that he had not been convicted of an offense
that had "elements substantially identical to those of a felony defined
as such under Alaska law,"'76 and that, therefore, the grand larceny
conviction could not be used to establish that he was a third felony
offender.77
Relying in part on the legislative commentary to the Criminal
Code, the court of appeals ruled that Wasson's grand larceny convic-
tion was improperly used to establish that he was a third felony of-
fender.78 Its holding, however, does not appear to be based on the fact
that the theft of $387 is a misdemeanor and not a felony under existing
law. Instead, after comparing the elements of Wasson's offense under
the former and current codes, the court of appeals concluded that the
value of the stolen property was an element of the prior offense and,
therefore, "it necessarily follows that a former statute providing a
lesser value for . . . felony grand larceny does not 'have [elements]
substantially identical to those of a felony defined as such under [cur-
rent] Alaska law.' "79 Subsequent cases emphasized that the court
must examine the specific elements of the prior felony for which the
defendant was convicted, and not the defendant's actual conduct in
committing that crime. If the specific elements were substantially
71. 652 P.2d 117 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
72. Id. at 118. Wasson conceded that another prior felony conviction could be
used to establish that he was a second felony offender. Id.
73. ALASKA STAT. § 11.20.400 (1976) repealed by ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130 (ef-
fective Jan. 1, 1980).
74. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.130-.140 (1983).
75. See id. § 11.46.140.
76. Id. § 12.55.145(a)(2).
77. Wasson, 652 P.2d at 118.
78. Id. at 119. The court of appeals cited the legislature's commentary that a
conviction "will be considered a prior felony conviction if the crime is defined by
elements substantially identical to a felony under the Code." Id. (quoting ALASKA
SENATE COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 157 (emphasis added by the court)). The
court of appeals concluded that "[iln context, it is clear that it is the revised code to
which the comment refers." Id.; see also Wright v. State, 656 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1983).
79. 652 P.2d at 119.
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identical to an existing Alaska felony, the prior conviction would be
considered a prior felony conviction under presumptive sentencing.80
While the holding in Wasson may have been a correct interpreta-
tion of the legislature's intent when it adopted presumptive sentencing
in 1978, the holding did not reflect the intent of a subsequent legisla-
ture. In 1982, the prior conviction definition was amended to require
only that the prior offense have "elements similar to those of a felony
defined as such under Alaska law at the time the offense was commit-
ted."I In the commentary that accompanied the amendment, the leg-
islature clarified the type of prior conviction that could be used to
establish repeat felony status under presumptive sentencing:
[A] prior offense will be considered a prior felony conviction for
purposes of presumptive sentencing if the conduct was similar to a
felony in Alaska at the time the offense was committed, regardless
of whether the offense is classified as a felony under existing law.
For example, if the defendant was convicted of the felony offense of
grand larceny in Oregon in 1962 for stealing $400, and that conduct
would have been a felony in Alaska in 1962, that offense may be
counted as a prior felony conviction under [ALASKA STAT. § ]
12.55.145 even though the revised Criminal Code now requires that
a felony theft involve property in an amount of $500 or more. 82
Under this definition then, Wasson's prior conviction would make him
a third felony offender since it was for an offense that was a felony
under Alaska law at the time it was committed.83
2. When a Conviction is Obtained "Prior" to the Current Of-
fense. Assuming that a conviction can otherwise be used to establish
the defendant's status as a repeat felony offender, the requirement that
it be obtained prior to the offense for which sentence is to be imposed
would not seem to present difficult interpretative questions for the sen-
80. See, eg., Wells, 687 P.2d at 351 ("We have consistently interpreted ALASKA
STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(2) to apply to the statute establishing the elements of the offense
for which the defendant was previously convicted."); Garroutte v. State, 683 P.2d 262,
268-69 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (prior Alaska conviction for the felony of receiving
stolen property cannot be used to establish that the defendant was a second felony
offender since statute under which defendant was convicted did not require proof of
value of property involved, while comparable current statute requires that the prop-
erty have value of $500 or more; trial court had found value of property stolen to
exceed $500).
81. Act of July 3, 1982, ch. 143, § 32, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 2-6 (effective
Oct. 1, 1982). The amendment has been referred to as "a change rather than a clarifi-
cation of existing law." Walsh v. State, 677 P.2d 912, 914 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
In Lee, the court of appeals noted that the amendment was "to resolve future
problems of the type involved in this case and in Wasson. " 673 P.2d at 895 n.4.
82. ALASKA SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMENTARY ON THE
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE, ALASKA SENATE J. Supp. No. 64,21-22 (June 2,
1982).
83. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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tencing court. Indeed, the terms first, second, and third felony convic-
tion are defined in a manner that appears to state the obvious.8 4 A
second felony conviction, for example, "means that the defendant pre-
viously has been convicted of a felony."85 Nonetheless, the meanings
of the terms first, second, and third felony convictions are not free
from ambiguity.
In State v. Rastopsoff,8 6 the defendant argued that a conviction
could not be used to establish repeat felony offender status if he was
convicted after he committed the offense for which sentence was to be
imposed.8 7 Rastopsoff faced sentencing for four crimes at a time when
he had already been convicted of a felony.88 That conviction, how-
ever, was not entered until after Rastopsoff had committed the four
crimes for which he currently faced sentencing.89
Despite the apparently unambiguous definition of repeat felony
offender status, 90 which both the superior court and the three-judge
sentencing panel had held applied to Rastopsoff,91 the court of appeals
agreed with Rastopsoff's argument. Relying in part on a decision by
the Alaska Supreme Court interpreting the scope of Alaska's repealed
habitual criminal statute,92 the court of appeals held that Rastopsoff
84. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.185(4), (7), (9) (1984).
85. Id. § 12.55.185(7).
86. 659 P.2d 630 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
87. Id. at 633.
88. In June of 1980, Rastopsoff committed forgery in the second degree, a class C
felony. Id. at 631-32. On August 26, 1980, he committed a burglary in the first de-
gree and a robbery in the second degree, both class B felonies. Id. Rastopsoff com-
mitted another burglary in the first degree on September 13, 1980, during which he
also committed assault in the third degree, a class C felony. Id. Indicted for all five
crimes, he pleaded guilty to the June forgery in October, 1980, and was sentenced. Id.
at 632. On February 24, 1981, he pleaded nolo contendere to the remaining four
charges. Id.
In sentencing Rastopsoff for the August and September crimes, the superior court
found that the October conviction for the June forgery was Rastopsoff's first felony
conviction, the August offenses constituted his second felony conviction, and the Sep-
tember offenses his third felony conviction. Id. The court, however, found that it
would be manifestly unjust to sentence Rastopsoff as a repeat felony offender on the
August and September crimes and referred the case to the three-judge panel. Id. The
panel agreed with the superior court's classification of the August and September con-
victions, and held that this application of presumptive sentencing violated the equal
protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. Id. The state subsequently appealed the
three-judge panel's constitutional holding to the court of appeals. Id. at 633.
89. See supra note 88.
90. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 88.
92. In State v. Carlson, 560 P.2d 26 (Alaska 1977), the Alaska Supreme Court
held that a defendant could not be sentenced under the provision of Alaska's former
habitual criminal statute, ALAKA STAT. § 12.55.050 (1976) (repealed 1978), when he
was convicted of two felonies on the same day. 560 P.2d at 28-29. The former statute
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must be treated as a first felony offender for each of the four crimes
that occurred before he was convicted of his previous felony.93 In a
subsequent case, the court of appeals held that a defendant is not con-
victed of a prior offense until sentenced for that offense.94 Conse-
quently, a conviction cannot be used to establish repeat felony offender
status unless the defendant was sentenced for that conviction before
committing the offense for which sentence is to be imposed.
3. Miscellaneous Issues Pertaining to Prior Convictions.
a. Statute of limitations for use of prior convictions. In 1978, the
legislature provided that a prior conviction could not be used to estab-
lish that the defendant is a repeat felony offender "if a period of seven
or more years has elapsed between the date of the defendant's uncon-
ditional discharge on the immediately preceding offense and commis-
sion of the present offense."' 95 The seven-year period did not begin to
run until the defendant completed all of the requirements of the prior
sentence, including any probationary or parole period.96 Under this
standard, for example, a defendant sentenced in 1985 would be a sec-
ond felony offender if he had been convicted of a felony in 1970 but
did not complete the parole period for that felony until 1979. Addi-
tionally, so long as the most recent prior conviction falls within the
seven year period, any conviction otherwise eligible as a prior convic-
tion, no matter how old, can be used to establish third felony offender
status. 97
In 1982, the legislature made two amendments to the statute of
specified an increased sentence for a defendant who is convicted of felony and "who
has been previously convicted of a felony." Id. at 27 n.2 (emphasis added). As the
court of appeals noted in Rastopsoff, the highlighted language in the former habitual
criminal statute is virtually identical to the definition of "second felony conviction" in
the Criminal Code. Rastopsoff, 659 P.2d at 634.
The court of appeals placed significant emphasis on the rule of statutory con-
struction that "when a legislature adopts specific statutory language that has previ-
ously been interpreted by the high court of the state in connection with other statutes
involving a similar subject matter, the legislature is presumed to have intended to
adopt the court's interpretation of that language, unless otherwise expressly indi-
cated." Id. at 635 (citation omitted). The court of appeals dismissed the state's argu-
ment that an intent to reverse the Carlson approach to the use of prior convictions was
apparent from the "just deserts" sentencing philosophy in the Criminal Code, id. at
637-40, and the legislative commentary to the prior conviction statute. Id. at 635-37.
93. 659 P.2d at 641.
94. Sawyer v. State, 663 P.2d 230, 232 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
95. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(1) (1980) (amended 1982).
96. Id. § 12.55.185(10) (1984).
97. Griffith v. State, 653 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam).
The court of appeals noted that if the application of this rule results in manifest injus-
tice, the case could be sent to the three-judge panel under ALASKA STAT.
§§ 12.55.165-.175 (1984). 653 P.2d at 1058.
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limitations provision that expand the category of prior convictions
that can be used to establish repeat felony offender status.98 First, the
legislature increased the seven year limitations period to ten years.99
Second, the legislature provided that a court must consider an unclas-
sified felony or a class A felony conviction as a prior conviction no
matter when it occurred. 100
b. Significance of the pendency of an appeal from a prior convic-
tion. The legislature has never addressed the issue of whether a prior
conviction on appeal can be used to establish that the defendant is a
repeat felony offender. The court of appeals, however, held that the
pendency of an appeal does not prevent the court from using the con-
viction to establish repeat felony offender status. 0 1
c. Prior suspended imposition of sentence. In Shaw v. State, 102 the
court of appeals held that a conviction resulting in a suspended impo-
sition of sentence can be used to establish repeat felony offender sta-
tus.10 3 In a subsequent case, however, the court of appeals held that a
prior conviction that was subsequently set aside cannot be used to es-
tablish repeat felony offender status. 1°4
d. Juvenile status at time of prior conviction. The fact that the
defendant was convicted of a prior offense in another jurisdiction as an
adult is irrelevant even if, at the time he committed that offense, he
would have been treated as a juvenile under Alaska law. Under such
circumstances, an otherwise eligible prior conviction can be used to
establish repeat felony offender status. 10 5
98. Act of July 3, 1982, ch. 143, § 33, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 26 (effective Oct.
1, 1982) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(1) (1984)).
99. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(1) (1984).
100. Id.
101. Wright, 656 P.2d at 1229; see also Bell v. State, 658 P.2d 787, 789 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1983). Of course, if the prior conviction is reversed on appeal, the sentence
imposed in the case where the prior conviction was used to establish repeat felony
status could be challenged as an illegal sentence. See Wright, 656 P.2d at 1229.
102. 673 P.2d 781 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), modified on other grounds, 677 P.2d
259 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
103. Id. at 786.
104. Larson v. State, 688 P.2d 592, 597 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.085(e) (1984) permits a court to "set aside the conviction and issue to the
person a certificate to that effect," after the defendant has completed the conditions of
a suspended imposition of sentence.
105. McManners v. State, 650 P.2d 414, 415-16 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); see also
Wells, 687 P.2d at 352.
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B. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: Adjustments to the
Presumptive Term
In its tentative draft of the Criminal Code, the Criminal Code
Revision Subcommission proposed the establishment of an Advisory
Commission on Prison Terms and Parole Standards to specify the fac-
tors for adjusting a presumptive term of imprisonment.10 6 The sub-
commission, of course, recognized the importance of aggravating and
mitigating factors under its proposed presumptive sentencing sys-
tem.10 7 The commentary to the tentative draft, for example, even in-
cluded a list of the aggravating and mitigating factors that the
subcommission had considered adopting. 08 However, the subcom-
mission decided that aggravating and mitigating factors should not be
statutorily prescribed, and the bill introduced in the legislature did not
list any of these factors. 109 The legislature disagreed with the subcom-
mission and decided to statutorily prescribe aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors.110
As enacted in 1978, the Criminal Code included a list of eighteen
aggravating and thirteen mitigating factors.1 "l In subsequent years, as
the number of crimes subject to presumptive sentencing increased 12
and oversights in the original lists were noted, 113 the list of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors grew. The statute now recognizes twenty-
106. ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REVISION, supra note 2, at 72.
107. See PROPOSED ALASKA STAT. § 11.36.270(b)-(j), ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE
REVISION, supra note 2, at 61-64.
108. See ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REVISION, supra note 2, at 72-74.
109. See H.R. 661, 10th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1978). The Subcommission con-
cluded "that by their nature [aggravating and mitigating factors] were susceptible to
change and that a legislatively prescribed list was too inflexible." ALASKA CRIMINAL
CODE REVISION, supra note 2, at 72; see also von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate
Penalty System in America: An Overview, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 289, 300 (1981) ("A
legislature, given the other demands on its time, will seldom be able or willing to
devote much effort to . . . revising, and fine tuning a sentencing code approved in
recent session."). But see infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
110. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)-(d) (1984).
111. Id. § 12.55.155(c)-(d) (1980) (amended 1982 & 1983).
112. The most significant increase in crimes covered by presumptive sentencing
occurred in 1982 when the legislature comprehensively revised the laws pertaining to
controlled substances offenses. Act of May 20, 1982, ch. 45, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws
1, 1-8 (effective January 1, 1983). The legislature transferred controlled substances
offenses from title 17 of the Alaska Statutes into the Criminal Code and classified the
newly created offenses under the classification scheme in the Criminal Code. See
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.010-.070 (1983). Sections 19 and 20 of the Act added four
aggravating and three mitigating factors to ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)-(d) (1984)
which apply in the sentencing of controlled substances offenses. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(c)(23)-(c)(26), (d)(14)-(d)(16) (1984).
113. See, e.g., Heathcock v. State, 670 P.2d 1155, 1160 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)
(Singleton, J., concurring and dissenting), in which Judge Singleton noted that it was
an oversight not to include the commission of an offense while on probation in the
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six aggravating factors and fifteen mitigating factors.' 1 4 These factors
frequently have been used to adjust presumptive terms of imprison-
ment, and Alaska appellate courts have had numerous opportunities
to determine whether particular aggravating' 1 5 and mitigating ' 16 fac-
tors were present and properly applied at sentencing.
original list of aggravating factors. The legislature subsequently rectified this over-
sight. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(20) (1984).
114. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)-(d) (1984).
115. Alaska's appellate courts have applied the following aggravating factors:
"(1) a person, other than an accomplice, sustained physical injury as a direct
result of the defendant's conduct;" ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(1) (1984). In Juneby
v. State, 641 P.2d 823 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), modified, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983), the court of appeals held that in a prosecution of sexual assault in the first
degree under ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(1) (1983) "the mere fact of some physical
injury to the victim as a result of the defendant's conduct, though technically an ag-
gravating factor. . ., will not justify a significant increase in the presumptive term."
Id. at 839. More substantial increases in presumptive terms are reserved for cases
where serious physical injury is inflicted. Id. However, "where the crime charged is
one that does not ordinarily involve the use of force or violence in its perpetration, the
fact that a person sustains injury - even if the injury is relatively slight - assumes
considerable importance as an aggravating factor." Id. at 838.
The continued validity of the court of appeals' conclusions in Juneby is question-
able after the decision of the Alaska Supreme Court in Woods v. State, 667 P.2d 184
(Alaska 1983). In Woods, the court stated that in a prosecution for sexual assault in
the first degree, the trial court may properly consider physical injury to the victim as
an aggravating factor and that "[tihe weight to be assigned to this aggravating factor
is a question which is committed to the sentencing court's discretion." Id. at 187-88.
The court noted that to the extent that this holding "is inconsistent with Juneby, 641
P.2d at 837-40, and Juneby II, 665 P.2d 30 at 34-37 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), those
opinions of the court of appeals are hereby modified." Id. at 188 n.13. On rehearing
in Juneby, the state had argued that the court of appeals' "treatment of the aggravat-
ing factor of physical injury is inconsistent with the basic holding of the Juneby opin-
ion that the amount by which presumptive sentences should be increased or decreased
in light of aggravating or mitigating factors must be determined by applying the Cha-
ney criteria, as stated in ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005, to the specific factors established
in each case." Juneby, 665 P.2d at 36-37. See also infra notes 131-34 and accompany-
ing text.
"(2) the defendant's conduct. . . manifested deliberate cruelty to another per-
son;" ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(2) (1984). In Juneby, the court of appeals stated
that
the term 'deliberate cruelty,' as used in ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(2)
must be restricted to instances in which pain - whether physical, psycho-
logical, or emotional - is inflicted gratuitously or as an end in itself. Con-
versely, when the infliction of pain or injury is merely a direct means to
accomplish the crime charged, the test for establishing the aggravating fac-
tor of deliberate cruelty will not be met.
Id. at 840.
For a particularly appropriate application of this factor, see Larson v. State, 688
P.2d 592 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); see also Peetook v. State, 655 P.2d 1308, 1311
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
"(3) The defendant was the leader of a group of three or more persons who partic-
ipated in the offense;" ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(3) (1984). See Willard v. State,
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When the legislature adopted the original list of aggravating and
662 P.2d 971, 980 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (factor established in prosecution for sexual
assault in the first degree of defendant not subject to presumptive sentencing).
"(4) the defendant employed a dangerous instrument in furtherance of the of-
fense;" ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(4) (1984). See Linn v. State, 648 P.2d 150, 153-
54 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (factor not established by proof of mere possession of a
dangerous instrument).
"(5) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the
offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age, disa-
bility, ill health, or extreme youth or was for any other reason substantially incapable of
exercising normal physical or mental powers of resistance;" ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(c)(5) (1984). See Carlson v. State, 696 P.2d 178, 179 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985); Goenett v. State, 695 P.2d 243, 245 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Depp v. State, 686
P.2d 712, 721 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (factor established in prosecution of defendant
not subject to presumptive sentencing convicted of sexual assault of a ten-year old
boy); Hasslen v. State, 667 P.2d 732, 732-33 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); State v. Coats,
669 P.2d 1329, 1332-33 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (in case where presumptive sentencing
did not apply, court of appeals cited this factor in discussing appropriate sentence for
defendant who had sexually abused twelve-year old step-daughter); Peetook, 655 P.2d
at 1311 (factor established in prosecution for sexual assault in the first degree of de-
fendant not subject to presumptive sentencing who attacked victim while she was
sleeping); Koganaluk v. State, 655 P.2d 339, 341 & n.4 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
"(8) the defendant's prior criminal history includes conduct involving aggravated
or repeated instances of assaultive behavior;" ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(8) (1984).
In Larson, 688 P.2d at 597, the court of appeals held that it was proper to consider
prior conduct resulting in an assault conviction under this factor even though the
conviction had been set aside. Larson was decided under a prior enactment of this
factor, but the court of appeals viewed the current version as a clarification of the
prior version. Id. In Larson, the court of appeals also confronted the issue of the
appropriate relation ofjuvenile adjudications to this factor. While the court of appeals
left open the issue of whether prior juvenile adjudications can be used to initially es-
tablish this factor, it did hold that once the factor is otherwise established, prior juve-
nile adjudications can be used in determining the weight to be given to the factor. Id.
at 598.
"(10) the conduct constituting the offense was among the most serious conduct
included in the definition of the offense;" ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(10) (1984). In
Juneby, 641 P.2d at 841, the court of appeals interpreted legislative intent to require
that a finding of this factor "be based on an assessment of the specific facts of each
case, viewed in relation to the most serious potential conduct constituting the offense
charged." (footnote omitted)
In Brezenoff v. State, 658 P.2d 1359 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), this factor was
established in a prosecution for theft in the first degree of a defendant not subject to
presumptive sentencing who stole $140,000 in 133 separate thefts during approxi-
mately one year. Id. at 1362. The court of appeals noted that this aggravating factor
"stresses the conduct involved in the specific offense under consideration rather than
the personal characteristics of the offender and requires comparison of the conduct
constituting the crime in question with other conduct which would satisfy the ele-
ments of the offense." Id. at 1363.
The court of appeals has had many opportunities to apply this factor in sexual
assault cases. See Bolhouse v. State, 687 P.2d 1166, 1174 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984)
(factor established in prosecution for attempted sexual assault in the first degree, when
attempt "came very close to constituting a completed rape."); Hasslen, 667 P.2d at
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mitigating factors, it also included a formula for determining the ex-
tent to which a presumptive term could be varied once the presence of
732-33 (factor established in prosecution for sexual assault in the first degree and as-
sault in the first degree where victim was assaulted in her own home, entry into house
was premeditated, victim's dog was killed, telephone was rendered inoperable and
victim was shot while attempting to escape); Langton v. State, 662 P.2d 954, 955-56
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (factor established where defendant, not subject to presump-
tive sentencing, convicted of sexual assault in the first degree on his eight-year old
step-daughter); Hansen v. State, 657 P.2d 862, 864 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Peetook,
655 P.2d at 1311; Koganaluk, 655 P.2d at 341 n.4; Ecker v. State, 656 P.2d 577, 577-
78 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); see also Goenett, 695 P.2d at 245 n.2; Theodore v. State,
692 P.2d 987, 988 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (Singleton, J., concurring); Walsh, 677 P.2d
at 917-18; Shaw, 677 P.2d at 260; Larson, 688 P.2d at 598; Lee, 673 P.2d at 896;
Gilbreath v. State, 668 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Karr v. State, 660
P.2d 450, 452 & n.4 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Kimbrell v. State, 647 P.2d 618, 622-23
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (Coats, J., concurring).
"(12) the defendant was on release under [ALASKA STAT. § ] 12.30.020 or
12.30.040 for another felony charge or conviction or for a misdemeanor charge or con-
viction having assault as a necessary element;" ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(12)
(1984). See Roberts v. State, 680 P.2d 503, 508 n.13 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984), where
the court of appeals held that the requirement that the prior offense have assault as a
necessary element applies only when the defendant was on release for a misdemeanor.
This factor is also established when a defendant commits an offense while on release
on a charge of attempted sexual assualt even though assault was not a necessary ele-
ment of the sexual assault.
"(13) the defendant knowingly directed the conduct constituting the offense at an
active officer of the court or at an active or former judicial officer, prosecuting attorney,
law enforcement officer, correctional employee, firefighter, emergency medical techni-
cian, paramedic, ambulance attendant, or other emergency responder during or because
of the exercise of official duties;" ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(13) (1984). In Gil-
breath, 668 P.2d at 1354, this factor was established in the prosecution of a defendant
for misconduct involving weapons in the first degree. Id. at 1357. The defendant
argued that even though he had pointed a gun at a police officer, the aggravating
factor did not apply because his offense was "one of possession" and, therefore, could
not have been "directed at" a law enforcement officer. Id. The court of appeals re-
jected this characterization, holding that the factor applied because the defendant's
"conduct" during the possessory offense was directed at a police officer. Id. at 1357-
58. The court of appeals noted that the defendant's conduct harmed the public inter-
est in "having the duties of public safety officers carried out efficiently and free from
hindrance" and avoiding the "possibility of public danger generated wherever a public
safety officer is challenged or hindered in the execution of his duties." Id. at 1358.
"(18) the offense was a crime specified in [ALASKA STAT. § ] 11.41 and was
committed against a spouse, a former spouse, or a member of the social unit comprised
of those living together in the same dwelling as the defendant;" ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(c)(18) (1984). In Carlson, the court of appeals held that in a prosecution
for sexual assault in the first degree under former ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(4)
"the fact that Carlson's victim was a member of his family is typical of the specific
crime for which he was convicted and therefore did not warrant an increase in the
presumptive term." Id. at 179 (footnote omitted). But see Woods, discussed supra in
this footnote under aggravating factor (1), where the Alaska Supreme Court empha-
sized that the amount by which a presumptive term should be increased once an ag-
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gravating factor is established, "is a question which is committed to the sentencing
court's discretion." 667 P.2d at 187-88.
"(20) the defendant was on furlough under [ALASKA STAT. § ] 33.30 or on pa-
role or probation for another felony charge or conviction;" ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(c)(20) (1984). See Kuvaas v. State, 696 P.2d 684, 684-85 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1985), in which a defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. At the
time he committed the robbery in question, the defendant was on felony probation
from Oregon for offenses that were not felonies under Alaska law at the time the
defendant committed them. Id. at 684. The court of appeals accepted the defendant's
argument that this factor should "apply only to defendants who were on probation for
a charge or conviction which would have been a felony charge in Alaska." Id. The
court applied the definition of "felony conviction" set out in ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.145(a)(2), defining those felony convictions the trial court may consider for
purposes of presumptive sentencing. Id. at 685; see supra text accompanying notes 81-
83.
"(22) the defendant knowingly directed the conduct consituting the offense at a
victim because of that person's race, sex, color, creed, ancestry, or national origin;"
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(22) (1984). See Gregory v. State, 689 P.2d 508, 509
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (factor found in prosecution for murder in the second degree,
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110 (1983), a crime not subject to presumptive sentencing).
"(25) the defendant is convicted of an offense specified in [ALASKA STAT. §]
1L 71 [any offense involving controlled substances] and the offense involved large quan-
tities of a controlled substance;" ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(25) (1984). See Laus-
terer v. State, 693 P.2d 887, 890-92 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) ("It would ordinarily be
appropriate to regard eight ounces or more of cocaine as a large quantity - one that is
indicative of commercial activity at the wholesale level.").
116. The following mitigating factors have been applied by Alaska's appellate
courts:
"(3) the defendant committed the offense under some degree of duress, coercion,
threat, or compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete defense, but which signifi-
cantly affected his conduct;" ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(d)(3) (1984). In Bell, the
court of appeals found that the legislature intended that duress under this factor be
interpreted more broadly than the defense of duress. 658 P.2d at 790. "Evidence the
defendant in good faith subjectively believed facts which if true would have estab-
lished one of the defenses justifying his conduct under the revised code, but which the
judge or jury concludes would have been unreasonable under the circumstances, may
warrant mitigation of a presumptive sentence." Id. at 791; see also Langton, 622 P.2d
at 960 ("We apply a subjective standard in interpreting [this factor] and do not require
that the person allegedly 'coerced' act reasonably." (citation omitted)); Whitmore v.
State, 657 P.2d 859, 860-61 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (factor not established in prosecu-
tion for escape); Lee, 673 P.2d at 896 (factor not established by "behavior that is
merely impulsive or the result of situational stress"; there must be evidence that the
defendant acted under "a good faith but unreasonable belief" that conduct was neces-
sary).
"(9) the conduct constituting the offense was among the least serious conduct
included in the definition of the offense;" ALASKA STAT. § 13.55.155(d)(9) (1984). See
Woods, 680 P.2d at 1198 (a single incident of sexual abuse is not a mitigated offense);
Walsh, 677 P.2d at 916-18. In Walsh, the court of appeals rejected the argument of a
defendant convicted of manslaughter that because his conduct was only reckless, as
opposed to intentional or knowing, the mitigating factor of least serious conduct
should apply. The court of appeals noted that there is no indication that the legisla-
ture intended to treat manslaughter committed recklessly any less severely than man-
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one or more of those factors was established. 117 That formula appar-
ently leaves substantial discretion to the trial court. For example, if
both aggravating and mitigating factors are established for a second
felony offender convicted of a class B felony, 118 the court can reduce
the four-year presumptive term by any amount or can increase it by
any amount up to the maximum sentence of ten years." 9 Aside from
the general direction that "[s]entence increments and decrements...
shall be based on the totality of the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors,"' 20 the legislature has provided little guidance on the specific
amount a presumptive term of imprisonment should be modified once
these factors are established.
In Juneby v. State, 121 the court of appeals adopted general guide-
lines for adjusting a presumptive term of imprisonment for factors in
aggravation and mitigation. 122 In doing so, the court helped insure
slaughter committed intentionally or knowingly. The court of appeals, however, did
discuss how this factor, or its opposite aggravating factor, ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(c)(10) (1984), see supra note 115, might be established in driving-while-
intoxicated manslaughter cases; Shaw, 677 P.2d at 160 (in prosecution for misconduct
involving weapons in the first degree for possessing a firearm capable of being con-
cealed on one's person and where defendant had previously been convicted of a felony,
court of appeals noted that "examples of the least serious conduct contemplated by
the statute might include a case in which a defendant finds a weapon and possesses it
briefly before returning it to its owner or turning it over to the police, or one in which
a defendant, without illegal purpose, briefly acts as caretaker of a weapon on behalf of
its owner." Id.); see also Dunlop v. State, 696 P.2d 687, 691-92 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983); Carlson, 696 P.2d at 179; Koteles v. State, 660 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1983) (factor not established in prosecution for burglary in the second degree);
Bell, 658 P.2d at 789-90 (factor not found in escape case); Fry, 655 P.2d 789, 793
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Born v. State, 633 P.2d 1021, 1026 n.5 (Alaska Ct. App.
1981).
"(13) the harm caused by the defendant's conduct is consistently minor and in-
consistent with the imposition of a substantial period of imprisonment;" ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(d)(13) (1984). In Shaw the court of appeals stated that this factor is not
established when the defendant's conduct "exhibits contempt for the law and law en-
forcement warranting a substantial sanction." 673 P.2d 781, 785 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983). See also Gilbreath, 668 P.2d at 1358-59 (factor not established in prosecution
of defendant for misconduct involving weapons in the first degree, "[g]iven the cir-
cumstances of the instant offense and the nature of Gilbreath's original felony, an
assault with a dangerous weapon," trial court's refusal to find this factor not clearly
mistaken); Koteles, 660 P.2d at 1201 (factor not found in prosecution for burglary in
the second degree).
117. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(a) (1984). See supra notes 34-44 and accompany-
ing text.
118. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(1) (1984).
119. See id. § 12.55.155(a)(1) (1984).
120. Id. § 12.55.155(b) (1984).
121. 641 P.2d 823 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), modified, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983).
122. 641 P.2d at 833.
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that the discretion permitted under the presumptive sentencing system
once aggravating and mitigating factors are established does not defeat
the purpose of the 1978 sentencing revisions - the elimination of un-
justified disparity in sentencing.1 23 *
Juneby was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, which
at that time was a class A felony, and burglary in the first degree, a
class B felony. 124 Since Juneby was a second felony offender, he faced
a presumptive term of imprisonment of ten years for the sexual as-
sault. 125 At sentencing, the trial court found several aggravating fac-
tors to be present and increased the ten year presumptive term to
twenty years, the maximum sentence for a class A felony.126 Juneby
appealed his sentence for the sexual assault, arguing that the trial
court gave too much weight to the aggravating factors and that his
twenty year sentence was excessive.127
The court of appeals conducted a comprehensive review of the
structure and purpose of presumptive sentencing. 28 It found that
"[t]he presumptive sentencing provisions . . . reflect the legislature's
intent to assure predictability and uniformity in sentencing by the use
of fixed and relatively inflexible sentences, statutorily prescribed, for
persons convicted of second and subsequent felony offenses." 129 Based
on this interpretation of the legislative intent, the court adopted gen-
eral guidelines for modifying a presumptive term of imprisonment for
factors in aggravation and mitigation. The court stated it expected
that sentences equalling or varying only slightly from the presump-
tive terms will generally be suitable when presumptive sentencing
applies. Minor adjustments for aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances might be appropriate in a significant number of cases; only
in unusual cases, however, can it be anticipated that substantial
deviation from the presumptive term will be called for.
...If sentencing courts were permitted, under the presump-
tive sentencing scheme, to deviate routinely and substantially from
the presumptive terms prescribed by law, the fundamental purposes
of eliminating disparity and establishing reasonable uniformity in
sentencing would be completely undermined. Unless the provisions
of ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 are adhered to strictly, and unless a
123. See supra text accompanying note 4.
124. 641 P.2d at 828. Sexual assault in the first degree was subsequently made an
unclassified felony, punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 30 years and
subject to presumptive sentencing regardless of the prior criminal history of the de-
fendant. Act of July 3, 1982, ch. 143, § 30, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 25 (effective
October 1, 1982) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i) (1984)).
125. 641 P.2d at 829.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 828-29. Juneby had also been sentenced to eight years imprisonment on
the burglary conviction but did not appeal that sentence. Id. at 828.
128. Id at 829-33.
129. Id. at 830.
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measured and restrained approach is taken in the adjustment of pre-
sumptive sentences for both aggravating and mitigating factors,
then the prospect of attaining the statutory goal of uniform treat-
ment for similarly situated offenders would quickly be eroded, the
potential for irrational disparity in sentencing would threaten to be-
come reality, and the revised code's carefully fashioned system of
escalating penalties for repeat offenders would be rendered utterly
ineffective. 130
While the court of appeals called for "a measured and restrained
approach" to the adjustment of a presumptive term of imprisonment
for aggravating and mitigating factors,131 it refused to adopt "a mech-
anistic approach toward determining the amount by which a presump-
tive sentence should be adjusted in light of aggravating or mitigating
factors." 132 Instead, it held that once aggravating or mitigating fac-
tors are properly established, the sentencing criteria set out in State v.
Chaney 133 should be applied to the "totality of the aggravating and
mitigating factors" to determine the sentence to be imposed.134
130. Id. at 833. On rehearing, the court of appeals phrased these guidelines some-
what differently, but the general thrust remained the same:
It can thus be expected that, in the great majority of cases, the appropriate
sentence will be one that does not depart significantly from the specified pre-
sumptive term. The process of adjusting presumptive sentences for aggra-
vating or mitigating factors is one that, while procedurally complex, must
not be applied inflexibly or mechanistically. In each case, a realistic assess-
ment of the totality of the evidence relating to aggravating and mitigating
factors must be made in order to determine the extent to which the case may
fairly be said to be more aggravated or more mitigated than the average for
the particular offense. Increasingly larger adjustments to presumptive terms
will be justified as cases deviate farther from the norm for a given offense.
The most significant upward or downward adjustments must be reserved for
those cases that are truly atypical or unusual in severity or lack of severity.
Juneby v. State, 665 P.2d 30, 39 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) modifying Juneby v. State,
641 P.2d 821 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
131. See Juneby, 641 P.2d at 847; see also supra text accompanying note 130.
132. 641 P.2d at 835 n.21.
133. For a discussion of the Chaney sentencing criteria, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 178-81. See also ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005(2)-(6) (1984), which sets out
the factors that a court should consider in imposing a sentence. In its commentary to
the Criminal Code the legislature noted that these legislative guidelines are "largely a
restatement of the Alaska Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate of article 1,
section 12 of the Alaska Constitution which provides that '[P]enal administration
shall be based on the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the
public.' State v. Chaney, 447 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970)." ALASKA SENATE COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 3, at 148. See also Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1982) (noting that the Chaney criteria have essentially been incorporated into
the Criminal Code as ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005).
134. 641 P.2d at 835 & n.21. The court of appeals, however, added the following
caution:
When applied to the adjustment of a presumptive sentence, however, the
Chaney analysis should not be broadened into a consideration of all the cir-
cumstances of the offense, as if the sentence were being imposed anew, with-
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Turning to Juneby's sentencing proceeding, the court of appeals
noted that both the state and Juneby had given the required notice of
an intent to raise aggravating and mitigating factors at sentencing. 135
The trial court had found that three aggravating factors and one miti-
gating factor were established. 136 The trial court "then engaged in an
extensive consideration of the Chaney sentencing criteria," 137 after
which it followed the recommendation of the presentence report and
sentenced Juneby to twenty years in prison. 138 The court of appeals
found this sentencing proceeding improper because the trial court had
never referred to the ten year presumptive term that applied to Juneby
nor did it explain why the established aggravating and mitigating fac-
out regard for the presumptive term. Instead, consideration of the Chaney
criteria should focus specifically on the aggravating or mitigating conduct in
the particular case. The presumptive term should remain as the starting
point of the analysis, and the Chaney criteria should be employed for the
limited purpose of determining the extent to which the totality of the aggra-
vating and mitigating factors will justify deviation from the presumptive
term.
Id. at 835 n.21.
An example of a proper application of the Chaney criteria to adjust a presumptive
term appears in Nell, 642 P.2d at 1371 n.18; see also Lloyd, 672 P.2d at 155 (trial court
can consider defendant's lack of criminal record in determining extent of deviation
from presumptive term once mitigating factors are established since "lack of any prior
record is highly relevant to a proper application of the Chaney sentencing criteria"
(footnote omitted)).
One option available to the trial court is to decide that the particular factors
established, after considering the Chaney criteria, do not justify adjustment of the pre-
sumptive term. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c), (d) (1984) (emphasis added),
which provides that aggravating and mitigating factors "shall be considered by the
sentencing court and may" aggravate or mitigate the presumptive term of imprison-
ment. In Juneby, the court stated that "[tihe mere proof of an aggravating or mitigat-
ing factor cannot be deemed sufficient, in and of itself, to justify an increase or
decrease of a presumptive term." 641 P.2d at 838; see also Staael v. State, 697 P.2d
1050, 1058 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Heathcock 670 P.2d at 1158 n.1 (Singleton, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
135. Juneby, 641 P.2d at 836. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(f) (1984) provides that
"[i]f the state seeks to establish a factor in aggravation at sentencing or if the defend-
ant seeks to establish a factor in mitigation at sentencing, written notice must be
served on the opposing party and filed with the court not later than 10 days before the
date set for imposition of sentence." See Nukapigak v. State, 645 P.2d 215, 218-19
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (presentence report does not provide the required notice);
Hartley v. State, 653 P.2d 1052, 1056 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (trial court may sua
sponte consider an aggravating factor or mitigating factor in imposing sentence so long
as it provides the required notice to the parties); see also Hasslen, 667 P.2d at 733
(upholding trial court's sua sponte finding of an aggravating factor without notice to
the parties when the defendant did not claim surprise or prejudice as a result of the
lack of notice).
136. 641 P.2d at 836.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 836-37.
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tors justified an increase in the presumptive term to the maximum sen-
tence of twenty years. 139 The court of appeals cited the statutory
requirement that all findings of aggravating and mitigating factors
"must be set out with specificity," 140 and held that specificity requires
sentencing judges to include, in their remarks on the record, the
following specific information: (1) the specific factors in aggrava-
tion and in mitigation found to have been established by clear and
convincing evidence; (2) the evidence upon which the court has re-
lied in finding the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors; (3)
an explanation of the weight given by the court to each aggravating
or mitigating factor, and the relative importance of each factor in
comparison with other aggravating or mitigating factors estab-
lished; and (4) an evaluation of the totality of the aggravating and
mitigating factors in light of the Chaney criteria, as expressed in
[ALASKA STAT. § ] 12.55.005, in order to determine the amount by
which the presumptive sentence for the particular offense should be
adjusted.141
Of the many appellate decisions interpreting the presumptive sen-
tencing statutes, Juneby is the most significant. Faced with a sentenc-
ing system designed to eliminate unjustified sentencing disparity by
limiting judicial sentencing discretion,142 the court of appeals instead
found a statutory scheme that still left substantial discretion to a trial
court once aggravating or mitigating factors were established. 143 In
calling for a measured and restrained approach to adjustment of pre-
sumptive terms, 144 and by requiring trial courts to articulate their rea-
sons for modifying the presumptive terms,145 the court of appeals
insured that the discretion permitted under presumptive sentencing
could not be used to subvert the purpose of presumptive sentencing.
III. SENTENCE REVIEW OF FIRST FELONY OFFENDERS NOT
COVERED BY PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING
The legislature in 1978 decided to apply presumptive sentencing
only in cases where the defendant was a repeat felony offender. 146 The
139. Id. at 837.
140. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.155(f) (1984).
141. 641 P.2d at 846 (footnote omitted). In subsequent cases brought before the
court on appeal, all of which involved sentences imposed before Juneby was published,
the court of appeals found that the sentencing proceedings failed to comply with the
Juneby requirements and were thus unlawful. See Linn, 658 P.2d at 153; Fry, 655
P.2d at 793; Dunn v. State 653 P.2d 1071, 1091 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Nukapigak
645 P.2d at 218.
142. See supra text accompanying note 4.
143. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying note 130.
145. See supra text accompanying note 141.
146. See Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 107 (amended 1982
& 1983). The type of prior felony conviction that can be used to establish that the
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single exception was for a first felony offender convicted of a class A
felony other than manslaughter, who had possessed or used a firearm
or caused serious physical injury during the commission of the of-
fense. 147 Except in these limited circumstances, first felony offenders
were not covered by the presumptive sentencing system enacted in
1978.148
At first glance, it might seem surprising that the legislature,
which specifically found "that the elimination of unjustified disparity
in sentences and the attainment of reasonable uniformity in sentences
can best be achieved through a sentencing framework fixed by stat-
ute," 149 would have exempted the vast majority of first felony offend-
ers from presumptive sentencing. On the other hand, the institution of
presumptive sentencing was a sharp break from the existing sentencing
practices. 150 The legislature was thus somewhat cautious in applying
this new sentencing system.
defendant is a repeat felony offender is discussed supra text accompanying notes 63-
105.
147. Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 166, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 107 (1980) (amended
1982). The current version of this section is discussed infra at note 154.
148. The court of appeals has rejected and termed as frivolous the contention that
the distinction between first and second felony offenders under the presumptive sen-
tencing system violates a second felony offender's consitutional rights of equal protec-
tion and due process. Koteles v. State, 660 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
149. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005 (1984).
150. In its report proposing a presumptive sentencing system, the Task Force on
Criminal Sentencing observed that:
The dominant sentencing structure currently employed in the United States
is based on the indeterminate sentence, so called because it is characterized
by wide separations between the legislatively authorized minimum and max-
imum sentences for generally defined crimes. There is an absence of articu-
lated criteria for determining sentences. Judges are given vast discretion in
sentencing offenders, and parole boards have like discretion in releasing
them ....
... Generally, there are few if any rules, standards, or guidelines, for-
mally established through mandatory legislation, rule making, or regulation,
to guide the exercise of judicial or administrative sentencing discretion. Nor
are discretionary decisions on sentencing generally subject to judicial review,
except in cases of clear abuse, which reviewing courts are reluctant to find.
Simliarly, the courts or administrative agencies generally have not articu-
lated guidelines for sentencing typical offenders. Every judge and parole
board member has his own notion of what a fairly typical crime "deserves"
- and these notions are of course disparate in the extreme.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-13.
The task force's characterization of the "dominant sentencing structure in the
United States" also describes the indeterminate sentencing system that existed in
Alaska before the enactment of the Criminal Code. Surveying the penalty provisions
under the former Criminal Code, the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission high-
lighted the wide range of judicial sentencing discretion authorized by the legislature.
While many substantive offenses appear to carry mandatory minimum
prison terms and fines, [ALASKA STAT. § ] 11.05.150 nonetheless permits a
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When it decided to exempt most first felony offenders from pre-
judge to suspend all or part of the minimum prison term and impose a lesser
sentence, either of a fine or imprisonment or both.
Prison terms in existing law evidence a wide variety of minimum and
maximum sentences, ranging from 20 years to life for first degree murder
([ALASKA STAT. § ] 11.15.010), 10 years to 20 years for assault on an officer
in jail ([ALASKA STAT. § ] 11.30.160), to 0 to 25 years for a second convic-
tion on use of firearms during the commission of certain crimes ([ALASKA
STAT. § ] 11.15.295). Sentences in the range of 1-20, 1-10 and 1-5 appear
more frequently than do other combinations but no particular combination
of minimum and maximum prison terms and fines is common to title
11. The variety is endless.
ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REVISION, supra note 2, at 4.
In addition to the courts' considerable discretion in imposing sentences, the pa-
role board had substantial flexibility in determining the length of the sentence that a
defendant would actually serve. Except when the court required a defendant to serve
a specified portion of a sentence before being eligible for parole, the parole board had
the authority to release a prisoner at any time after one-third of a sentence had been
served. ALASKA STAT. §§ 33.15.080, .180, .230(a) (1982). The parole board fre-
quently exercised its discretionary release authority.
The task force's observations on the lack of sentencing criteria and guidelines
limiting judicial sentencing discretion, and the absence of effective judicial review of
sentencing practices accurately described the sentencing structure existing in Alaska
before 1969. Indeed, until it enacted the Criminal Code, the legislature had never
specified the factors that should be considered by a court in imposing sentence. Addi-
tionally, in Dear v. State, 439 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1968), the Alaska Supreme Court had
held that absent statutory authority, it lacked "jurisdiction to review and remand or to
review and revise a criminal sentence for abuse of discretion." Id. at 435. Absent that
authority, the court could not hope to specify the criteria that should be considered at
sentencing.
In 1969, the legislature responded to Bear by authorizing appellate review of
sentences on the ground that the sentence was either too lenient or too excessive.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (1984). The Alaska Supreme Court articulated guidelines
for determining whether a sentence is too strict or too lenient in State v. Chaney, 477
P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970). For a discussion of what became known as the Chaney crite-
ria, see infra text accompanying notes 177-81.
The judicial effort to articulate sentencing criteria and guidelines through appel-
late review of sentences under Chaney was insufficient to address all of the problems
inherent in Alaska's indeterminate sentencing system for several reasons. First, since
a "clearly mistaken" standard of review applied in sentence appeals, only the most
serious sentencing errors could be corrected through the appellate process. Second,
while a defendant's successful appeal would result in the imposition of a less severe
sentence, if the state brought a successful appeal, and the defendant had not also ap-
pealed, the appellate court could only express its disapproval of the sentence. See
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(a)-(b) (1984). Thus, while appellate review of sentences
offered some protection to a defendant who received an excessive sentence, it offered
no protection to the public in insuring that a defendant who had been sentenced too
leniently would receive an appropriate sentence. For example, upon application of the
Chaney criteria, the courts found eight clearly mistaken lenient sentences imposed in
prosecutions for crimes under the former Criminal Code. In each case, however, the
appellate court was unable to impose an appropriate sentence. See Putnam v. State,
629 P.2d 35, 44-45 (Alaska 1980); State v. Wassilie, 578 P.2d 971, 972-75 (Alaska
1978); State v. Abraham, 566 P.2d 267, 270-71 (Alaska 1977); State v. Lancaster, 550
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sumptive sentencing, the legislature largely followed the recommenda-
tion of the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission which proposed
that presumptive sentencing only apply to repeat felony offenders.15,
The subcommission, however, had been divided on this issue. The
competing viewpoints were summarized in its Tentative Draft of the
Criminal Code:
A closely divided Subeommission then agreed to limit the applica-
tion of presumptive sentencing to those defendants with prior felony
convictions. While aware that this decision could result in some
continued amount of sentencing disparity, those who favored the
majority position were of the opinion that a new program as radical
in concept as presumptive sentencing ought to be implemented
slowly. They reasoned that if presumptive sentencing presented no
problems in its areas of application, then the legislature could al-
ways later move to expand its applicability to all offenders.
Those in the minority argued that the concept was not so radi-
cal or complex, that it could eliminate a greater amount of potential
or real disparity if applied across the board to all felony offenders,
and that the failure to apply presumptive sentencing to those with
no prior convictions could result in first time felony offenders re-
ceiving longer sentences than second or subsequent offenders.152
When it adopted the Criminal Code in 1978, the legislature de-
parted from the majority view of the subcommission by applying pre-
sumptive sentencing to a limited category of first felony offenders
convicted of class A felonies. 153 In 1982 the legislature expanded the
category of first felony offenders subject to presumptive sentencing to
include all first felony offenders convicted of class A felonies. 154 Addi-
P.2d 1257, 1258-60 (Alaska 1976); State v. Wortham, 537 P.2d 1117, 1118-19 & n.4
(Alaska 1975); Chaney, 477 P.2d at 445 & n.19, 446; State v. Jensen, 650 P.2d 422,
423-25 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); State v. Doe, 647 P.2d 1107, 1107-11 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1982).
Finally, the process of appellate sentence review failed to correct the disparities
that can arise in an indeterminate sentencing system where the trial court is given
substantial unguided discretion in imposing sentence. Indeed, little significance was
placed on uniformity as a goal of sentence review. Laquement v. State, 644 P.2d 856,
861 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823, 830 & n.8 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1982), modified, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). Considering that uniform-
ity in sentencing was not an important goal of appellate sentence review and also that
only "clearly mistaken" sentencing errors would be corrected on appeal, it is not sur-
prising that the appellate process did not correct the types of sentencing disparities
noted by the judicial council, see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
151. ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REVIsION, supra note 2, at 70.
152. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
154. Act of July 3, 1982, ch. 143, 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws 1 (effective October 1,
1982). The Act provides a five-year presumptive term of imprisonment for a first
felony offender convicted of manslaughter. See id. § 28, at 24. Any other first felony
offender convicted of a class A felony is subject to a five-year presumptive term unless
"the defendant possessed a firearm, used a dangerous instrument, or caused serious
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tionally, during that same 1982 session, the legislature further ex-
panded the scope of presumptive sentencing to include first felony
offenders convicted of class B or class C felonies, provided that the
felony was knowingly directed at a limited category of public officials
or emergency personnel engaged in the performance of their duties. 155
In support of the view that presumptive sentencing should apply
to first felony offenders, a minority on the Criminal Code Revision
Subcommission argued that the failure to do so could result in a first
felony offender being sentenced more severely than a second felony
offender.156 Theoretically, at least, this result is possible under the
statutory scheme.157 In Austin v. State,158 the Alaska Court of Ap-
peals considered whether a first felony offender should ever receive a
harsher sentence than a second felony offender. The Austin decision
insured that the sentencing of first felony offenders who were not cov-
ered by presumptive sentencing would nevertheless be directly affected
by the presumptive sentencing scheme.
Austin was convicted of second degree criminal mischief, a class
physical injury during the commission of the offense," in which case the presumptive
term is set at seven years. Id. The provisions of section 28 of the Act are codified in
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(l)-(2) (1984).
155. Act of July 3, 1983, ch. 92, 1983 Alaska Sess. Laws 1. The Act provides that
a first felony offender faces a presumptive term of two years if convicted of a class B
felony, and a one year presumptive term if convicted of a class C felony, if the offender
"knowingly directed the conduct constituting the offense at a uniformed or otherwise
clearly identified peace officer, fire fighter, correctional officer, emergency medical
technician, paramedic, ambulance attendant, or other emergency responder who was
engaged in the performance of official duties at the time of the offense." Id. The
provisions of the Act are codified in ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(3), .125(e)(3)
(1984). Committing a class A felony under these circumstances subjects a first felony
offender to the seven year presumptive term of imprisonment specified in ALASKA
STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(2) (1984).
As noted, supra notes 38 & 60, the legislature failed to make conforming amend-
ments to the statutes restricting judicial discretion to suspend imposition of sentence
or to grant probation to first felony offenders convicted of class B or C felonies despite
the fact that they were made subject to presumptive sentencing in the 1983 Act. It
also did not restrict the parole eligibility of those offenders.
156. See supra text accompanying note 152.
157. For example, consider a second felony offender convicted of a class B felony.
Assuming that no aggravating or mitigating factors are established, the presumptive
term of imprisonment that must be imposed, absent a finding of manifest injustice, is
four years. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(1) (1984). On the other hand, consider
a first felony offender who commits the same class B felony under identical circum-
stances as the second felony offender. Since presumptive sentencing does not apply to
the first felony offender, see id. § 12.55.125(d), the trial court may impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum sentence of ten years. See id.. This hypo-
thetical assumes, of course, that the offender does not fall within the category of first
felony offenders described in id. § 12.55.125(d)(3). See supra note 155.
158. 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam).
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C felony. 159 Since he was a first felony offender, Austin faced a maxi-
mum term of imprisonment of five years but was not subject to pre-
sumptive sentencing. 60 Austin was sentenced to three years
imprisonment and appealed his sentence as excessive on the ground
that the presumptive term of imprisonment for a second felony of-
fender convicted of a class C felony was only two years. 161 The court
of appeals held that Austin's sentence was not excessive. The court
stated that
[n]ormally a first offender should receive a more favorable sentence
than the presumptive sentence for a second offender. It is clear that
this rule should be violated only in an exceptional case. However, it
is also clear that the legislature did not intend to say that a first
offender could never receive more time to serve than the presump-
tive sentence for a second offender, since the statute easily could
have been written to accomplish that result.162
The court of appeals cited several reasons why Austin's situation
presented an exceptional case under its new sentencing guideline.
Austin's extensive and continuous series of juvenile offenses,1 63 his nu-
merous probation violations, 164 and the aggravated nature of his
crime,165 led the court of appeals to conclude that Austin's three year
sentence was appropriate even though it was greater than the pre-
sumptive term of imprisonment for a second felony offender convicted
of the same felony.1 66
The court of appeals made two important clarifications of the
Austin sentencing guideline in subsequent cases. First, in Tazruk v.
State, 167 it held that for purposes of comparing the sentence received
by a first felony offender with the presumptive sentence for a second
felony offender,168 a court should focus primarily on the period of im-
159. Id. at 657. Austin had unlawfully taken a car and caused damages to it in an
amount exceeding $500, thus violating ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.482(a)(4) (1983). 627
P.2d at 657.
160. 627 P.2d at 657. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(e) (1984).
161. 627 P.2d at 657 & n.2; see ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(e)(1) (1984).
162. 627 P.2d at 657-58.
163. Id. at 658. The court of appeals observed that "Austin's record is so extensive
and involves so many offenses that it is difficult to list them all." Id. at 658 n.3.
164. Id. at 658.
165. Id. The court noted that Austin fled in the stolen car when he was spotted by
an officer, crashed into two parked cars, causing considerable damage to all three cars,
and then ran away from the collision. Id.
166. Id.
167. 655 P.2d 788 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
168. When it has applied the Austin guideline, the court of appeals has compared
the actual sentence of the first felony offender to the presumptive term of imprison-
ment for a second felony offender convicted of the same crime without adjusting the
presumptive term for mitigating or aggravating factors. See, e.g., Shaisnikoff v. State,
690 P.2d 25, 27-28 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Nashoalook v. State, 663 P.2d 975, 980
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prisonment actually imposed on the first felony offender.169 Tazruk,
as a first felony offender convicted of a class B felony, had been sen-
tenced to eight years imprisonment but had five years of that sentence
suspended. 170 Since the presumptive term for a second felony offender
convicted of a class B felony is four years, 171 the court of appeals held
that Tazruk's sentence of three years of actual confinement complied
with the requirements of Austin. 172
The second clarification of the Austin guideline concerned the
standard for determining whether a first felony offender's conduct
presented an exceptional case justifying the imposition of a more
lengthy sentence than the presumptive sentence for the second felony
offender. In Neakok v. State, 173 the court of appeals held that an ex-
ceptional case finding "must be justified either by specific aggravating
factors under the criminal code, . . . or else by aggravating factors
which would. . . justify a repeat offender receiving an enhanced sen-
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Brezenoff v. State, 658 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983). But see Hernandez v. State, 691 P.2d 287, 291 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) ("in
Austin v. State, . . .we held that a first offender should receive a more favorable
sentence than a similarly situated second offender who was subject to presumptive
sentencing." (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
The court of appeals has conceded that in focusing on the presumptive term of
imprisonment for a second felony offender, the Austin guideline fails to acknowledge
the possibility that the presumptive term might have been reduced because of mitigat-
ing factors. See Langton v. State, 662 P.2d 954, 962 n.5 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
169. 655 P.2d at 789; see also Pickens v. State, 675 P.2d 665, 671-72 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1984); Nashoalook, 663 P.2d at 980.
170. Tazruk 655 P.2d at 789.
171. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(1) (1984).
172. 655 P.2d at 789. In Brezenoff, however, the court of appeals restated the Aus-
tin guideline as clarified in Tazruk as follows:
Where the total sentence received by a first offender exceeds the presumptive
sentence for a second offender but the period of actual imprisonment is sub-
stantially less, we will conclude that the total sentence meets the Austin re-
quirement of a substantially more favorable sentence for the first offender.
658 P.2d at 1362 (emphasis added). Neither Austin nor Tazruk, however, requires
that the term of imprisonment imposed on a first felony offender be substantially less
than the presumptive sentence for a second felony offender. Austin, 627 P.2d at 657-
58; Tazruk, 655 P.2d at 789. Austin merely required that the sentence normally be
"more favorable" for the first offender, see supra text accompanying note 162, while in
Tazruk the court held that the sentence for a first felony offender complied with Aus-
tin because it was "less" than the presumptive term of imprisonment for a second
offender. Tazruk, 655 P.2d at 789.
The courts have generally not used the "substantially less" language in subse-
quent applications of Austin. See, eg., Short v. State, 676 P.2d 612, 614 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1984); Nashoalook, 663 P.2d at 980. But see Shaisnikoff, 690 P.2d at 28 (unsus-
pended sentence for a first felony offender "should be substantially more favorable"
than presumptive term for second felony offender).
173. 653 P.2d 658 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
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tence by a three-judge panel." 174
Alaska's appellate courts have had many opportunities to review
a sentence for a first felony offender that was more severe than the
presumptive sentence for a second felony offender. In some cases, the
appellate court explicitly determined whether aggravating factors or
extraordinary circumstances were present which rendered the case ex-
ceptional under Neakok and Austin. 175 In other cases, the appellate
court simply cited Austin and decided whether the case was excep-
tional without specifically finding that aggravating factors were pres-
ent or that the case could have been sent to the three-judge panel if
presumptive sentencing had applied to that case. 176
The inconsistent application of the Neakok exceptional case stan-
dard may be explained by the fact that the "[s]entencing of first felony
offenders to whom presumptive sentencing does not directly apply
must be accomplished, primarily, by a careful balancing of the sen-
tencing goals set out in State v. Chaney. ,,177 In Chaney, 178 the court
adopted a "clearly mistaken" standard for determining whether an im-
174. Id. at 662 (citation omitted). Actually, the court of appeals first applied this
standard less than two weeks before Neakok was published. Sears v. State, 653 P.2d
349, 350 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). However, in Sears, the court of appeals did not state
the exceptional case standard with the same clarity as it did two weeks later in
Neakok
If the Neakok clarification of exceptional cases under the Austin guideline were
applied to the facts in Austin, the particularly aggravated nature of Austin's crime, see
supra note 165, most likely would have established the aggravating factor that "the
conduct constituting the offense was among the most serious conduct included in the
definition of the offense." ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(10) (1984). Additionally, the
court of appeals has noted that "[i]mplicit in our decision in Austin was the recogni-
tion that a particularly bad juvenile or misdemeanor record characterized by offenses
similar to the offense currently under consideration might warrant referral to a three-
judge panel." Erhart v. State, 656 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
175. See, e.g., Shaisnikoff, 690 P.2d at 27; Goenett v. State, 695 P.2d 243, 244-45
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Lausterer v. State, 693 P.2d 887, 890-92 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985); Theodore v. State, 692 P.2d 987, 988 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Smith v. State,
682 P.2d 1125, 1126-27 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Maal v. State, 670 P.2d 708, 710-11
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Willard v. State, 662 P.2d 971, 979-80 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983); Brezenoff, 658 P.2d at 1361-63; Peetook v. State, 655 P.2d 1308, 1310-11
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
176. See, e.g., Karr v. State, 686 P.2d 1192, 1195-96 (Alaska 1984); Jacko v. State,
689 P.2d 506, 507 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Mathison v. State, 687 P.2d 930, 931
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Winslow v. State, 685 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Alaska Ct. App.
1984).
177. Peetook 655 P.2d at 1310; see also Karr, 686 P.2d at 1194 ("The standards
under which sentences are to be reviewed were established in State v. Chaney." (cita-
tion omitted)). But see Maal, 670 P.2d at 711-12 (in light of "just deserts" theory of
punishment adopted by the Criminal Code, "inordinate emphasis must not be placed
on predictions of possible future misconduct" in imposing sentence).
178. 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).
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posed sentence was either too excessive or too lenient. 179 The court
also articulated sentencing goals to be used in evaluating whether a
sentence was clearly mistaken.' 80 These goals became known as the
Chaney criteria. The court stated that:
[u]nder Alaska's Constitution, the principles of reformation and ne-
cessity of protecting the public constitute the touchstones of penal
administration. Multiple goals are encompassed within these broad
constitutional standards. Within the ambit of this constitutional
phraseology are found the objectives of rehabilitation of the offender
into a noncriminal member of society, isolation of the offender from
society to prevent criminal conduct during the period of confine-
ment, deterrence of the offender himself after his release from con-
finement or other penological treatment, as well as deterrence of
other members of the community who might possess tendencies to-
ward criminal conduct similar to that of the offender, and commu-
nity condemnation of the individual offender, or in other words,
reaffirmation of societal norms for the purpose of maintaining re-
spect for the norms themselves.' 81
While the Austin guideline has proven to be a useful device to
alert an appellate court to sentences which may be clearly mistaken
under the Chaney criteria, 182 compliance with the Austin guideline
does not automatically guarantee that the sentence will be affirmed on
appeal.18 3 On the other hand, the court of appeals has never upheld a
sentence for a first felony offender that violated the Austin guideline as
clarified by Neakok and Tazruk 18 4 Consequently, it is necessary to
consider whether the Austin guideline is an appropriate standard to
highlight sentences that may be excessive under the Chaney criteria.
While comparing nonpresumptive sentences imposed on first fel-
ony offenders with presumptive sentences for second felony offenders
is useful to highlight excessive sentences, the Austin guideline fails to
take one significant factor into consideration: defendants subject to
presumptive sentencing are not eligible for parole while other defend-
179. Id. at 443-44.
180. Id. at 443.
181. Id. at 444 (footnotes omitted).
182. See, eg., Kimbrell v. State, 647 P.2d 618, 622 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
183. See, eg., Maal, 670 P.2d at 711 (Austin guideline satisfied but sentence never-
theless held to be clearly mistaken and vacated); Hansen v. State, 657 P.2d 862, 864
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (sentence clearly mistaken despite compliance with Austin
guideline).
184. In Erhart, 656 P.2d at 1201, the court of appeals noted that it had never
upheld a term of imprisonment for a first felony offender that exceeded the presump-
tive term of imprisonment for a second felony offender absent a finding of aggravating
factors or extraordinary circumstances. Since Erhart, the court of appeals has vacated
as excessive every sentence which it has found to be in violation of theAustin guideline
as clarified by Neakok. See, eg., Shaisnikoff, 690 P.2d at 27-28; Jacko, 689 P.2d at
507.
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ants may generally be paroled after serving one-third of their
sentences. 185 Indeed, between 1970 and 1979, approximately two-
thirds of felony offenders not sentenced to life terms were released by
the board of parole before the expiration of their sentences, including
eighty percent of those prisoners sentenced to terms of three years or
more. The average prisoner released on parole during that period
served slightly more than a third of the sentence imposed by the trial
court. 1
8 6
The courts' failure to consider parole eligibility in applying the
Austin guideline is surprising since the court of appeals has acknowl-
edged that "a prison sentence imposed prior to enactment of the
[Criminal Code] is by no means equivalent to a sentence presump-
tively imposed."18 7 Particularly in the case of "lengthy" sentences, 88
the court of appeals noted that a sentence imposed presumptively
"must be regarded as significantly more severe than [the identical sen-
tence] imposed under prior law, when early parole in cases involving
lengthy sentences was the order of the day." 189 Since first felony of-
fenders who are exempt from presumptive sentencing have the same
parole eligibilty as defendants sentenced under prior law,190 these ob-
servations by the court of appeals appear equally applicable in com-
paring presumptive sentences with nonpresumptive sentences.
Consider, for example, a four year sentence for the same crime
committed under identical circumstances imposed on both a first fel-
ony offender not subject to presumptive sentencing and a second fel-
ony offender sentenced presumptively. Assume further that no
aggravating factors or extraordinary circumstances are present in
either case. While the second felony offender is required to serve the
entire four year sentence, minus a maximum good conduct credit of
one-fourth of the sentence imposed,' 9 ' the first felony offender is eligi-
ble for release by the parole board after serving sixteen months, or
one-third of the four year sentence. 192 Although the court of appeals
referred to a lengthy sentence imposed under presumptive sentencing
as "significantly more severe" than the same sentence imposed on an
185. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 33.15.180(a), .080 (1982); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 60.
186. Juneby, 641 P.2d at 845 n.37 (citing ALASKA BOARD OF PAROLE, PAROLE
GUIDELINES FOR ALASKA, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, TIME SERVED COMPONENT
(September 1980)).
187. Juneby, 641 P.2d at 845.
188. Though the court of appeals did not specifically define what constitutes a
lengthy sentence, it cited parole statistics which equated "long terms of incarceration"
with sentences in excess of three years. Id. at 845 n.37.
189. Id. at 845 (footnote omitted).
190. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.15.180 (1982).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
192. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.15.080 (1982).
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offender who is eligible for parole, 193 the four year sentence imposed
on the first felony offender violates the Austin guideline as currently
applied because it is not more favorable in length. 194 More signifi-
cantly, the court of appeals has vacated, as excessive, every sentence
which it has found to violate the Austin guideline.19 5
The consequences of failing to consider parole eligibility in apply-
ing the Austin guideline were highlighted recently in Shaisnikoff v.
State. 196 Shaisnikoff was convicted of criminally negligent homicide
committed during a drunken bar room fight and was sentenced to five
years imprisonment with three years suspended.19 7 The presumptive
term of imprisonment for a second felony offender convicted of crimi-
nally negligent homicide is two years. 198 No aggravating factors or
extraordinary circumstances were established at Shaisnikoff's sentenc-
ing hearing. 199 The court of appeals held that Shaisnikoft's sentence
violated the Austin guideline because it was less favorable to him than
the presumptive sentence for a second felony offender and because
Shaisnikoff's situation did not present an exceptional case.2co The
court then found the sentence to be clearly mistaken and ordered that
193. See supra text accompanying note 189.
194. This sentence would violate the Austin guideline since no aggravating factors
or extraordinary circumstances had been established and the term of imprisonment
the first felony offender would be required to serve is not more favorable than the
presumptive sentence for the second felony offender. See supra text accompanying
notes 162-76.
The court of appeals has recognized that a sentence imposed on a second felony
offender subject to presumptive sentencing is not the equivalent of an identical sen-
tence imposed on a first felony offender exempt from presumptive sentencing. It has
not, however, taken this recognition into account in applying the Austin guideline.
See DeMan v. State, 677 P.2d 903 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). In DeMan, the court of
appeals noted in applying the Austin guideline that the defendant, a first felony of-
fender, received a sentence equal to the presumptive sentence for a second felony of-
fender. Id. at 912. In the accompanying footnote, the court of appeals acknowledged
that the defendant's sentence is "not the precise equivalent of" the presumptive sen-
tence for a second felony offender since if the defendant had been subject "to presump-
tive sentencing, he would have been ineligible for parole." Id. at 912 n.5. The
sentence was upheld because the defendant's situation presented an exceptional case.
See also Gibbs v. State, 676 P.2d 606, 608 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (parole eligibility
taken into consideration in determining whether sentence for first felony offender,
which complied with Austin, was excessive); Ecker v. State, 656 P.2d 577, 578 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1982) (nonpresumptive sentence is "potentially more lenient" than identical
sentence imposed presumptively because of parole eligibility).
195. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
196. 690 P.2d 25 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
197. Id. at 26.
198. Criminally negligent homicide is a class C felony. ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.130(b) (1983). The presumptive term for a second felony offender convicted
of a class C felony appears in ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(e)(1) (1984).
199. 690 P.2d at 27.
200. Id. at 27-28.
1985]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
on remand it be reduced to three years imprisonment with two years
of that suspended, 201 thus requiring Shaisnikoff to serve only one year
of imprisonment.
To the extent that the goal of the court of appeals is to insure an
appropriate relationship between sentences for first felony offenders
not subject to presumptive sentencing and presumptive sentences for
second felony offenders, decisions such as Shaisnikoff are inconsistent
with that goal. Not only did the court of appeals reduce Shaisnikoff's
initial sentence to one-half the presumptive term for a second felony
offender, but it failed to consider that Shaisnikoff would be eligible for
parole after serving four months of his sentence. Acknowledging these
circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the sentence imposed
by the trial court was clearly mistaken and why the sentence imposed
by the court of appeals was appropriate. Indeed, the only justification
the court of appeals cited for its sentence reduction was that Shais-
nikoff's sentence violated the Austin guideline.202
Recognizing the effect of parole eligibility on the actual time
served by an offender raises questions concerning the appropriateness
of the court of appeals' reliance upon the Austin guideline as determin-
ing, at least in practice, when a sentence is excessive under Chaney. 203
Of course, the courts could consider parole eligibility when applying
the Austin guideline. This approach, however, would be subject to the
criticism that, despite statistical data strongly indicating that eligible
offenders are likely to receive an early parole, 2°4 a case-by-case as-
sumption of parole eligibility in applying the Austin guideline would
render the comparisons speculative.
A more direct approach to ensure an appropriate relationship be-
tween sentences imposed on first and second felony offenders is to ap-
ply presumptive sentencing to all felony offenders. This uniform
approach would eliminate the need for an increasingly complex and
sometimes inaccurate comparison of sentence lengths imposed on de-
fendants sentenced under two different sentencing systems. Moreover,
applying presumptive sentencing to all felony offenders would allow
courts to focus on the Chaney criteria in making appropriate adjust-
ments of presumptive terms for aggravating and mitigating factors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1978 revision of the state's sentencing laws attempted to
eliminate unjustified disparity in sentencing.20 5 This purpose has been
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
205. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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well served by legislative amendment and judicial interpretation of the
presumptive sentencing statutes. The legislature has gradually in-
creased the number of crimes and offenders subject to presumptive
sentencing20 6 and has added to the list of the aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors that can be considered by a trial court in adjusting a pre-
sumptive term of imprisonment. 20 7 These amendments guide judicial
sentencing discretion in a greater number of cases and insure that ap-
propriate factors are taken into account during sentencing. At the
same time, the expansion of presumptive sentencing reduced the possi-
bility that improper sentencing considerations, such as the race of the
defendant 2 8 or the sentencing attitude of a particular judge,20 9 will
affect the sentence imposed.210 Appellate interpretations of ambigu-
ous provisions in the presumptive sentencing statutes consistently rec-
206. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
208. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
209. See supra text accompanying note 7.
210. Langton v. State, 662 P.2d 954 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), provides a graphic
illustration of the extreme sentence variations that can occur when defendants con-
victed of the same crime, committed under essentially identical circumstances, are not
sentenced under the presumptive sentencing system. Langton involved three separate
sentence appeals which were consolidated for review. Id. at 955-56. Each defendant
had been convicted of a sexual assault in the first degree on a young child under
former ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(3) (repealed 1983). Id. at 955. At the time the
offenses were committed, sexual assault in the first degree was a class A felony. Of-
fenders who had not previously been convicted of a felony were exempt from pre-
sumptive sentencing and faced a sentence that could be as high as twenty years
imprisonment. Id. at 961.
The three Langton defendants, Langton, Doe, and Joe, were first felony offenders
and therefore not covered by presumptive sentencing. Id. at 955. Each was sentenced
by a different judge. Id. Langton was sentenced to ten years imprisonment with four
years suspended and appealed the sentence as excessive. Id. Doe was not required to
serve a single day of imprisonment and the state appealed the sentence as too lenient.
Id. Joe was required to serve a sentence of twenty years imprisonment and appealed
the sentence as excessive. Id.
Langton had pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault in the first degree and
was sentenced to two concurrent ten-year terms of imprisonment with four years of
each term suspended. Id. at 955. The court of appeals affirmed Langton's sentgnce,
characterizing Langton's conduct as "the most serious" conduct included in the defi-
nition of the offense, in light of his history of sexual abuse, his disregard of the court
order to avoid contact with the victim, and his unwillingness to seek counseling. Id. at
956. The court of appeals concluded that the circumstances of the case justified a
sentence of at least six years imprisonment. Id.
Unlike Langton's conduct, Doe's conduct appeared to be an isolated event. Id. at
957. After pleading guilty to the assault of his sons, Doe was sentenced to five years
imprisonment, all of which was suspended. Id. Doe was placed on probation and
ordered to seek psychological counseling. Id. at 955. The trial court justified this
sentence by characterizing the assault as an isolated incident brought on by a stressful
marital relationship, noting Doe's history as a steady worker and a good provider. Id.
at 957. The court of appeals disapproved of Doe's sentence as being too lenient, but
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ognize the legislature's purpose in enacting presumptive sentencing
and attempt to apply the statutes to further the legislative goal of elim-
inating unjustified sentencing disparity.211
In light of this background, presumptive sentencing may eventu-
ally apply to all felony offenders. Indeed, of the fourteen states which
have adopted presumptive sentencing systems, 212 Alaska is unique in
exempting from presumptive sentencing first felony offenders who
would be subject to presumptive sentencing if they were repeat felony
offenders.213 Including all felony offenders under presumptive sen-
lacked the ability to increase the sentence. Id. at 959; see also supra note 158 (explain-
ing the court of appeals' inability to increase sentences it finds too lenient).
Like Doe's conduct, Joe's sexual assault was also an apparently isolated event.
Id. at 961. Like Doe, Joe also had a good employment history and, additionally, had a
stable relationship with his wife and three children. Id. at 961. The judge who sen-
tenced Joe, however, characterized him as a "dangerous offender" and sentenced him
to the statutory maximum sentence of twenty years. Id. The court of appeals held
that his sentence was excessive. Id. at 955. Citing the isolated nature of Joe's act, the
court of appeals rejected the characterization of Joe as a "dangerous offender." Id. at
961. Holding that Joe should be sentenced to no more than ten years imprisonment,
the court of appeals remanded the case for resentencing. Id.
Judge Singleton's concluding paragraphs in Langton concisely summarized the
three disparate sentences imposed on each defendant and the unsatisfactory modifica-
tions of the sentences that the court of appeals was authorized to effect:
Langton, Doe and Joe were convicted of sexual assaults of children. Of the
three, Langton was the worst offender, since he committed many separate
assaults over a long period of time. Doe assaulted two children on one occa-
sion and Joe committed a single assault. In all other respects, the offenses
are virtually indistinguishable. In a rational system seeking to eliminate dis-
parity and attain reasonable uniformity, Langton should have received the
most severe sentence, and Doe and Joe similar and substantially less severe
sentences. In actuality, Langton received a much less severe sentence than
Joe, and Doe received no period of imprisonment at all. While we have modi-
fied two of the sentences, the modified sentences still leave substantial disparity
in place. This unsatisfactory result is a necessary concommitant of the sub-
stantial trial court discretion which still exists for first-felony offenders
where the ultimate decision must rest upon an application of the clearly mis-
taken standard.
Id. at 962-63 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Subsequent to the sentencing in
the Langton cases, the legislature applied presumptive sentencing to all offenders con-
victed of sexual assault in the first degree. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i) (1984);
Langton, 662 P.2d at 956 n.3.
211. See, e.g., Maldonado v. State, 676 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984)
("A major purpose in enacting the revised Criminal Code was to eliminate unjustified
disparity in sentencing."); Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823, 830 n. 11 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982) ("[I]t is manifest that the legislature's focus on eliminating disparity and achiev-
ing uniformity in sentences was calculated to significantly restrict the trial court's
traditionally broad sentencing discretion."), modified, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983).
212. See supra note 2.
213. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN § 13-701 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(2)
(West. Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105(l)(a)(I)-(b) (Supp. 1984); FLA.
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tencing will complete the effort begun in 1978 to establish a rational,
predictable, and uniform sentencing system in Alaska.
STAT. ANN. § 921.001(4)(a) (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-
1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1982); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-4 to -7 (Bums 1979 & Supp.
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 (West Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)
(West Supp. 1985-1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1340.4 (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 9721 (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-27-30(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.94A.120, .310 (Supp. 1985).
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